## 1NC

### 1NC -- K

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Anti-black exploitation is a global phenomenon that transcends borders, gender, and class. The fungibility of the slave secures white domination over black flesh as white slave masters are able to manipulate and violate black people anyway imaginable.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 302-305, JMH]

The Black people who worked at Mario’s had little in common politically: Master and DeNight kept their politics to themselves, as did most of South Africa’s thirty-five million Black people when they were at work; this was also true of Sibongile and Liyana. Nicolas and Sipho were IFP members, sworn enemies of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Fana, the dishwasher, was a dedicated comrade. All of these differences mattered in important ways. None of them mattered in ways that were essential. We were all positioned in the same place paradigmatically. We were all, in other words, the antithesis of the Human. We were all implements on Mario and Riana’s plantation. **From the Arab slave trade, which began in ad 625, through its European incarnation beginning in 1452, everyone south of the Sahara had to negotiate captivity. At a global level of abstraction we can see how Africa has been carcerally contained by the rest of the world for more than a thousand years. There’s no habeas corpus here. Captivity overdetermined the condition of possibility for everyone’s life.** How people performed on a carceral continent was as varied as the “choices” made by us at Mario’s. Some fled the coast and trekked deeper into the interior to avoid notice and, with any luck, capture—the way DeNight kept to the corners of the restaurant where no one was likely to speak with him when he wasn’t serving his tables. Some made themselves indispensable (for as long as possible) to the White slavers by becoming slave hunters— like Nicolas and Sipho, and impimpis of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Some wore their prowess and pride on their sleeves and lashed out without a plan or foresight—like me. Some confided in the mistress in the hope, perhaps, of attaining some form of sanctuary, or for reasons they themselves could not fathom—like Doreen. **The essential Afropessimist point rests not in a moral judgment of the choices they made, but in an ethical assessment of the common dilemma they all shared—the questions that haunt the slave’s first waking moments: What will these White people do to my flesh today? How deep will they cut?** Some were captured and refused to live. Some sent their children to a different death, as in Beloved. The dreams of all these different captives could not be reconciled, but their place in the paradigm was the same. They woke up each morning with a deeper anxiety than the proletariat, the worker. The proletariat wakes up in the morning wondering, How much will I have to do today and how long will I have to do it? Exploitation and alienation morphed into an early morning ulcer. How much will the capitalist demand of me and how long will I have to do it? Again, the Slave wakes up in the morning wondering, What will these Humans do to my flesh? A hydraulics of anxiety that is very different than exploitation and alienation. If a can of tuna or a bucket of nails could speak, their essential questions would not revolve around how their labor power is being exploited, or how they are alienated from the value that they produce. Exploitation and alienation are not the grammar of their suffering. (How can one exploit an implement?) And the value that a tool helps produce never accrues to the tool. **For the Slave, the implement, exploitation and alienation are trumped by accumulation and fungibility. Slaves themselves are consumed, not their labor power. Slaves are implements, not workers. What Marx called “speaking implements”:** Mario and Riana’s speaking implements. Our response to captivity was as varied as the myriad choices that our ancestors made hundreds of years ago on that continent. But the question was the same: What will these White people do to my flesh? And the answer is the same: Anything they want. **There is no habeas corpus here,** Rebone warned. She didn’t know how right she was: for Black people there is no habeas corpus anywhere. Doreen knew this better than any of us. She negotiated her captivity by fainting: her unconscious attempt to save herself by throwing herself overboard. When she came to, she was staring up into the faces of all her masters, and me, a fellow slave. Freelance pallbearers took her body to the ambulance. She would live, when what she really may have wanted was to follow death into freedom; to jump ship before it docked. Who wouldn’t tell them what they wanted to hear? There’s no habeas corpus here. Doreen and the rest of us lived (if lived is the word) in a paradigm of violence that bore no analogy to the violence of exploitation and alienation suffered by the worker. Doreen was the first Black person specifically hired, and officially sanctioned, to handle money with her Black hands. White South Africans had hired her to break their libidinal laws—to violate the mainstays of their collective unconscious. Then some trickster in the alcove whispers in her ear what her intuition had not let her think out loud: that it was all a setup. **The Black people who worked at Mario’s were different ages, ethnicities, and genders. But these differences at the level of identity did not alter our sameness at the level of position. One does not position oneself in the world; one is born into a name that’s been chosen. Perhaps there was a moment of solidarity sparked by a common acknowledgment of our common position within social death.** If there was such a moment, it was splintered: The stern way Master schooled me in the locker room and the flickers of kindness he showed in the tensest situations, gestures that put his wife and his children in Venda, to whom he sent money each month, at risk. The way Nicolas and Sipho did not hurt me, or worse, when they had the chance; a deed for which they would have been exonerated and rewarded.

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization]  
(Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

### 1NC -- CP

#### Deez United Slave States Federal Nigga Terrorizers need to stop that selfish ass shit and let us get our shit together.

#### AYO what’s that shit? Mista Charlie’s language be that shit, stuck to a nigga like Velcro. Befo I flip em scripts, we gotta alter and expose Standard ‘Merican English that kill em caged birds.

Morrison 93 (Toni, The Nobel Prize in Literature 1993 Lecture, Toni Morrison is an American novelist, essayist, editor, teacher, and professor emeritus at Princeton University. Morrison won the Pulitzer Prize and the American Book Award in 1988 for Beloved. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1993/morrison-lecture.html>)

Speculation on what (other than its own frail body) that bird-in-the-hand might signify has always been attractive to me, but especially so now thinking, as I have been, about the work I do that has brought me to this company. So I choose to read the bird as language and the woman as a practiced writer. She is worried about how the language she dreams in, given to her at birth, is handled, put into service, even withheld from her for certain nefarious purposes. Being a writer she thinks of language partly as a system, partly as a living thing over which one has control, but mostly as agency - as an act with consequences. So the question the children put to her: "Is it living or dead?" is not unreal because she thinks of language as susceptible to death, erasure; certainly imperiled and salvageable only by an effort of the will. She believes that if the bird in the hands of her visitors is dead the custodians are responsible for the corpse. For her a dead language is not only one no longer spoken or written, it is unyielding language content to admire its own paralysis. Like statist language, censored and censoring. Ruthless in its policing duties, it has no desire or purpose other than maintaining the free range of its own narcotic narcissism, its own exclusivity and dominance. However moribund, it is not without effect for it actively thwarts the intellect, stalls conscience, suppresses human potential. Unreceptive to interrogation, it cannot form or tolerate new ideas, shape other thoughts, tell another story, fill baffling silences. Official language smitheryed to sanction ignorance and preserve privilege is a suit of armor polished to shocking glitter, a husk from which the knight departed long ago. Yet there it is: dumb, predatory, sentimental. Exciting reverence in schoolchildren, providing shelter for despots, summoning false memories of stability, harmony among the public. She is convinced that when language dies, out of carelessness, disuse, indifference and absence of esteem, or killed by fiat, not only she herself, but all users and makers are accountable for its demise. In her country children have bitten their tongues off and use bullets instead to iterate the voice of speechlessness, of disabled and disabling language, of language adults have abandoned altogether as a device for grappling with meaning, providing guidance, or expressing love. But she knows tongue-suicide is not only the choice of children. It is common among the infantile heads of state and power merchants whose evacuated language leaves them with no access to what is left of their human instincts for they speak only to those who obey, or in order to force obedience. The systematic looting of language can be recognized by the tendency of its users to forgo its nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties for menace and subjugation. Oppressive language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more than represent the limits of knowledge; it limits knowledge. Whether it is obscuring state language or the faux-language of mindless media; whether it is the proud but calcified language of the academy or the commodity driven language of science; whether it is the malign language of law-without-ethics, or language designed for the estrangement of minorities, hiding its racist plunder in its literary cheek - it must be rejected, altered and exposed. It is the language that drinks blood, laps vulnerabilities, tucks its fascist boots under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as it moves relentlessly toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind. Sexist language, racist language, theistic language - all are typical of the policing languages of mastery, and cannot, do not permit new knowledge or encourage the mutual exchange of ideas. The old woman is keenly aware that no intellectual mercenary, nor insatiable dictator, no paid-for politician or demagogue; no counterfeit journalist would be persuaded by her thoughts. There is and will be rousing language to keep citizens armed and arming; slaughtered and slaughtering in the malls, courthouses, post offices, playgrounds, bedrooms and boulevards; stirring, memorializing language to mask the pity and waste of needless death. There will be more diplomatic language to countenance rape, torture, assassination. There is and will be more seductive, mutant language designed to throttle women, to pack their throats like paté-producing geese with their own unsayable, transgressive words; there will be more of the language of surveillance disguised as research; of politics and history calculated to render the suffering of millions mute; language glamorized to thrill the dissatisfied and bereft into assaulting their neighbors; arrogant pseudo-empirical language crafted to lock creative people into cages of inferiority and hopelessness. Underneath the eloquence, the glamor, the scholarly associations, however stirring or seductive, the heart of such language is languishing, or perhaps not beating at all - if the bird is already dead.

#### Shonuff, Nommo be channelin the insights of hood scholar Docta G and our elders to get em plans in line wit da spiritz medium for diasporic freedom. Can I get an Amen?

Yancy 4 (George, Ph.D. Duquesne University. “Geneva Smitherman: The Social Ontology of African-American Language, the Power of Nommo, and the Dynamics of Resistance and Identity Through Language. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy - Volume 18, Number 4, 2004 (New Series), pp. 273-299.)

After having read my chapter, a white philosopher whom I admire came up to me at an American Philosophical Association (APA) conference and told me how he really enjoyed the piece and how he had not known so many intimate details about my life. He added: "I really enjoyed it, but why did you use that language [meaning African American Language]? You write very well [meaning in "Standard" American English]. You don't have to use that language to make your point." I listened in silence, realizing that he completely missed the point. Indeed, for him, African American Language was not a viable language, not a legitimate semiotic medium through which my life-world could best be represented. Rather, in his view, the language that I chose to use was slang, an ersatz form of communication that clearly should not have been used. By using African American English I had somehow fallen from the true heights of academic professionalism and broken the norms of respectable philosophy-speak. Indeed, perhaps he thought that I was being "too Black" in my speech, not white enough, not "proper" enough. As Frantz Fanon observed, "Nothing is more astonishing than to hear a black man express himself properly, for then in truth he is putting on the white world" (Fanon 1967, 36). Fanon's observations suggest deeper relationships that may exist between the function of language and a specifically racialized and racist philosophical anthropology. Again, Fanon observed: The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter—that is, he will come closer to being a real human being—in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language. I am not unaware that this is one of man's attitudes face to face with Being. A Man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language. What we are getting at becomes plain: Mastery of language affords remarkable power. (18, my emphasis) Fanon's observations also contain profound implications for the specifically racial and cultural dimensions of philosophy-speak. Indeed, perhaps in the U.S. it is philosophy-speak that is "too white," creating a kind of dislocation for many Black folk who find it necessary to speak African American Language to communicate some subtle cultural experience or way of "seeing the world" philosophically. This does not mean that Anglo-American or European languages are inherently inadequate for expressing philosophical ideas per se; rather, the point is that these languages are presumed the normative media through which philosophy qua philosophy can best be engaged. It is the imperialist and, of course, colonialist, tendency of these languages that is being rejected. Nevertheless, in my chapter, it was not I who failed philosophy, but it was "Standard" American English—that dominant, territorial, imperial medium of philosophical expression in the U.S.—that failed to convey the logic, the horror, the humanity, the [End Page 274] existentially rank, the confluent, and the surreal realities embedded in my experiences in one of America's Black ghetto enclaves. It is here that one might ask: "Are Anglo-American and European philosophical forms of discourse inadequate for re-presenting the complexity of Black experiences?" After all, not any form of discursivity will do. My experiences were in excess of what "Standard" American English could capture. Some forms of knowledge become substantially truncated and distorted, indeed, erased, if not expressed through the familiar linguistic media of those who have possession of such knowledge. In a passage rich with issues concerning the lack of power and effectiveness of "Standard" American English to capture the personal identity and personal experiences of a young Black boy, writer R. DeCoy asks: How ... my \*\*\*\*\*\* Son, can you ever hope to express what you are, who you are or your experiences with God, in a language so limited, conceived by a people who are quite helpless in explaining themselves? How can you, my \*\*\*\*\*\* Son, find your identity, articulate your experiences, in an order of words? (quoted in Brown 2001, 59-60) Regarding white philosophers (or even Black ones) who simply fail to understand the importance of African American Language as a rich cultural and philosophical site of expression, I believe that it is the job of knowledgeable and responsible Black philosophers—at least for those who are willing to admit that they speak both the Language of Wider Communication (or LWC) and the powerful vernacular shaped by African retentions and African American linguistic nuances—to invite them to enter African American semiotic spaces of discursive difference and overlap. We should keep in mind that being Black or African American in North America does not ipso facto mean that one is familiar with the subtle complexities and power of African American Language. After all, there are Black philosophers from middle-class (and lower-class) backgrounds whose linguistic assimilation of "Standard" American English, a form of cultural capital ownership and privilege, functions both as a badge of white acceptance and as an antidote for reducing white anxiety and fear. The invitation, though, should not be a plea, but an honest gesture to explore the language on its own terms. This is why it was so very important that this present article be written unapologetically in the language of my nurture: the medium had to be the message. Keep in mind that an invitation is not the same as a forced introduction. This was the situation that Blacks of African descent faced; they were forced to learn the language of the colonizer, forced to split, to multiply in so many different cultural, psychological, linguistic, and spiritual directions against their will. The fact that this article appears in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy invites a certain level of cultural and linguistic splitting on the part of [End Page 275] its readers, perhaps not very different from what is required when reading Kant or Heidegger, particularly given their penchant for neologism. Let's be honest, articles that typically appear in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy have no doubt been written in "Standard" American English and by predominantly white male philosophers, philosophers who have been trained to engage in "proper" philosophical prose. I, too, can write in this language. To write in this language is to reproduce the professional culture of philosophy, to perpetuate lines of power, and to show that you have been "properly" educated and worthy of hire. Moreover, to engage in this discourse is to perform linguistically before an audience of gatekeepers who probably fear too much fat in their discourse, too much play, too much signifying, too much indirection, too much ambiguity, too much vagueness, too much concrete, everyday reality. Like African American Language within the larger context of "Standard" American Language, by appearing in this journal this article also enters into a space of established norms of linguistic propriety, calling into question and perhaps rupturing the authority of "Standard" philosophical prose, that unhip discourse of professional philosophers. Of course, having this article published in this journal could turn out to be a curse or a blessing. Realizing the degree to which "proper" philosophical discourse is required by philosophy journals, and how such discourse in turn shapes and legitimates philosophy journals, many readers of the journal may read the article with contempt. Some may approach the article as a piece of exotica. Some may even view my use of African American Language as a disgraceful "Stepin Fetchit" performance that does a disservice to Black philosophers who are all too eager to perform well in the presence of white power, to show the world that we be real philosophers because we speak the language of Mister Charlie. Then, of course, there are some philosophers who are open to creative possibilities, differences, and alternatives to hegemonic linguistic territorialism, who believe in plural experiences and multiple discourses for articulating them. It's here, of course, that I got to give props to my man JJS for being hip to the importance of multiple philosophical voices and the different and complex existential spaces within which they emerge. When the medium is the message, one has got to get wit da medium. It will take more than this article to create a significant impact on a certain linguistic-philosophical reference point that is buttressed by so much history and power, but the Journal of Speculative Philosophy is a good place to begin, right in the midst of professional philosophy-speak. To best articulate that Black existential space where the real world (not that abstract possible world) is filled with pain, struggle, blood, tears, and laughter—where death follows a minute of joy, where so much is improvisatory and surreal, moving with the quickness, where the streets are hot, dangerous, and familial, where love is abundant and hate smiles in yo face, where melodic sounds fight to stay above the sounds of gunfire, where babies cry all night long, because mama done gone and hit the pipe, where a brotha gots to be down, where brothas be runnin game, talkin that talk, keepin it real, [End Page 276] and showin much loyalty—requires fluency in the language that partly grows out of the nitty-gritty core of the epistemology and ontology of that space. It is my contention that African American linguist Geneva Smitherman is working within the rich situated practices of Africana philosophy and should be acknowledged as such. She is self-consciously aware of the metareflective analysis that is necessary to make sense of what it means for Black people to have forged an identity through the muck and mire of white racism. After all, Black folk were deemed inherently inferior, cultureless, without Geist. Yet, Black agency survived the tortuous African blood-stained water of the Atlantic. Like Jazz (with its improvisatory structure and chromatic form), the Blues (with its ontology of lyrically holding at a distance incredible pain and sorrow), and rap music (with its phat beats, lyrical braggadocio, and in yo face street reality), African American Language is a significant site of Black cultural innovation, syncretism, and survival, laden with situated epistemological insights. There is no other way to honor the work of Geneva Smitherman, to explore the "language-gaming" of everyday Black folk, without directly and unapologetically entering into the dynamic, rhythmic, ritual, and cognitive spaces of African American linguistic expressiveness. Hence, from the very giddayup, that is, befo I bees gittin into some really dope cultural, historical, philosophical, and linguistic analyses, let's engage in a lil bit of naming and claiming. Word! The power of Nommo. Geneva Smitherman (a.k.a. Docta G) is an educational activist, a word warrior, a language rights fighter, a linguist-activist, and a linguistic democratizer. Can I get a witness? Yeah, that's right. She is the legitimizer of African American Language (AAL) (Smitherman 2001, 347). The shonuff sista from the hood who is cognizant of what it means to be a New World African, to be linked to that shonuff Black space of talkin and testifyin, stylin and profilin. AAL is the language of her nurture (343). She was, after all, baptized "in the linguistic fire of Black Folk" (Smitherman 1997, 242). Believe me, for if I'm lyin, I'm flyin, she knows the source of those deleted copulas ("The coffee cold"), those post-vocalic -r sounds ("My feet be tied," not "tired"), redundant past tense markings ("I likeded her," not "liked"), few consonant pairs ("Those tesses was hard," not "tests"), stylizations, and rhetorical devices. Docta G operates within that unique African American space of performative "languaging," a space of agency, contestation, self-definition, poiesis, and hermeneutic combat. She is all up in the cultural sphere of ashy knees, nappy hair, and how we be actin so saddity. Ah, yes, and she knows about the hot comb as a cultural artifact of self-hatred, a form of hatred instilled through the power of colonial white aesthetics. She member where she come from. She got no desire to front. Docta G's medium is the message. She avoids what linguist-philosopher John L. Austin refers to as the "descriptive fallacy," which involves the assumption that the main function of language is to describe things. Through the incorporation of AAL flava in her written works (and no doubt in [End Page 277] her lectures), Docta G is doing something with those words and phrases. Her writings, in short, are demonstrative enactments of the historical, stylistic, political, communicative, cognitive, and social ontological power of African American Language. Docta G is the lion who has learned how to write, how to narrate a counterhistorical narrative, and how to recognize and theorize a counterlanguage. A metalinguist, she is a cultural, ethical, and political theorist. If push comes to shove, she'll "choose goodness over grammar" (349). She knows that the politics of language policy is a larger question of the politics of reality construction, historical structuring of society, race, class, and Anglo-linguistic imperialism. As such, she moves between both the sociolinguists (who stress social and ethnic language) and the Cartesian or Chomskyan linguists (who stress "ideally competent" language). She knows that the right to speak AAL is a question of linguistic freedom, agency, and justice. A womanist, moving within that bold, self-assertive, and we-affirming space of sistas like Angela Davis, Alice Walker, Patricia Hill Collins, Sojourner Truth, and Harriet Tubman, Docta G is responsible, in charge, and serious. She's no prisoner of the academy; rather, she is existentially and politically committed to the Black community, its survival, and the continual actualization of its cultural generative force. Smitherman maintains that a womanist denotes an "African-American woman who is rooted in the Black community and committed to the development of herself and the entire community" (Smitherman 1996, 104). African American women, empowered by their womanist consciousness, were well-aware that white feminists had failed to critique, self-reflexively, the normativity of their own whiteness. Epistemologically, Black womanists occupied their own subject positions, positions that did not square with the theorizations of white middle-class women. You dig (Wolof: dega) what I'm sayin? Can I get an Amen? Docta G, "daughter of the hood," raised in Brownsville, Tennessee, was culturally immersed in the rich locutionary acts of Black folk (Smitherman 2000, xiii). Y'all wit me? I'm pointing to the significant links between Docta G's biographical location and how this influenced her later theorizations about AAL. Consistent with feminist, womanist, social constructionist, and postmodernist insights, one's social location is a significant hermeneutic lens through which to understand one's theorizations. By emphasizing one's social location, one is able to avoid the obfuscating process of reification. As social constructionists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann maintain, "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly suprahuman terms" (Berger and Luckmann 1995, 36). In short, the lived-context, as existential phenomenology stresses, is always already presupposed in relationship to epistemological claims. Docta G, daughter of the Black ghetto, daughter of Reverend Napoleon, was an early witness to the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of a linguistically rich Black family, a sharecropping community, and a Traditional Black Church. For example, she knows the power of tonal semantics, a significant [End Page 278] feature of AAL that moves the listener through melodic structure and poignant rhetorical configuration. She relates that her father once expressed the following theme in one of his sermons: "I am nobody talking to Somebody Who can help anybody" (Smitherman 2001, 222). Geneva, monolingual and from the sociolinguistic margins, was well-aware of what it meant to be deemed a problem, to endure the pain of being told that her speech was "pathological," "wrong," "inferior," "bad," and "derelict." Having gone North (or was it simply up South?) where she attended college, Geneva had to pass a test "in order to qualify for the teacher preparation program" (1). Given the then oppressive and racist language policy, a policy that stressed the importance of teachers being able to speak the language of those who "carry on the affairs of the English-speaking people" (2), Geneva did not pass the speech test. Docta G explains: We found ourselves in a classroom with a speech therapist who wasn't sure what to do with us. Nobody was dyslexic. No one was aphasic. There was not even a stutterer among us. I mean here was this young white girl, a teaching assistant at the university, who was just trying to get her Ph.D., and she was presented with this perplexing problem of people who didn't have any of the communication disorders she had been trained to deal with. (2) Although Geneva eventually passed the test by simply memorizing the pronunciation of particular sounds she needed to focus on, she came to interpret this experience as key to stimulating her politico-linguistic consciousness. She relates that "it aroused the fighting spirit in me, sent me off into critical linguistics and I eventually entered the lists of the language wars" (3). Clearly, this experience created in Geneva a powerful sense of agency and praxis. On the strength! You know it. As Kenyan philosopher and literary figure Ngu~gi~ wa Thiong'o argues, "There is no history which is purely and for all time that of actors and those always acted upon" (Thiong'o 1993, 131). Uhm talkin bout a Womanist, Docta G. You know, the chief expert witness for the linguistic intelligence of Black children, the one who has made it her political project to challenge effectively the totalizing systems of Euro/Anglo-linguistic cultural normativity. You betta act like you know. She fightin against African American linguistic erasure. Naw, even more so, she fightin for African American hue-manity. Docta G reveals that AAL is not some broken, ersatz sign system relegated to the confines of ghetto life; rather, AAL is the language of Black America (Smitherman 2001, 350). Docta G is up on it; she operates in that deeply deep space of African American signs and symbols, a semiotic space where individual words and phrases carry the weight of an entire world-view. As Frantz Fanon asserts, "To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture" (Fanon 1967, 38). I'm talkin bout an entire life-world where folk gotta live under conditions of much oppression, at the bottom, where Black bodies and souls constantly struggle to move within a compressing and collapsing social cosmos. [End Page 279] Sendin out an S.O.S. call. There appears to be a blue shift in the Black existential universe. But as we move to the center of it all, to the heart and soul of these historicizing, proud Black people, we notice a dynamic process of reconstitution, reinterpretation, being, and becoming. We be a praxis oriented people who are defined by our communicative acts, our existential improvisatory modes of being, forms of world-making, and ways of re-narrating, over and over again, our historical and spiritual links to Africa and the Americas. Toasts. Yo mamma! Some Baaaaad people we be. Coded language. Gangsta limp. Bloods and Crips. Lightin up that spliff. Yo, it's a Philly blunt! Catchin the spirit. Is it glossolalia or scatting? The Amen corner. Bench walkin preachers. "This ain no prayin church." "Naw, we a prayin church, Reb. Preach Brotha!" Call and response. Moans, shouts, and groans. All of these significations are capable of establishing a psychocognitive communal dynamic of shared cultural, religious, and intrapsychological meaningfulness (Smitherman 2001, 222). In the fields, in the storefront church, or from the lips of the Godfather of funk, it's all good. The sacred and secular always already organically fused. As Docta G notes, "It is, after all, only a short distance from 'sacred' Clara Ward's 'I'm climbin high mountains tryin to git Home' to 'secular' Curtis Mayfield's 'keep on pushin / can't stop me now / move up a little higher / someway or somehow'" (Smitherman 1977, 56). Tarrying all night long. Those Black bodies, forming a deep and harmonious Mitsein, will move and groove until the break of dawn. These Bluesified, Jazzified, funkified, spiritualized, and aestheticized sites of existence. \*\*\*\* she slammin! She's a brick. Uhm talkin bootylicious. Shakin that jelly. Ask Destiny's Child. Movin those hips. You know it didn't start with Elvis. Bootylicious! Aesthetics? Erotica? You tell me. I gots to come clean. Does the French naturalist Georges Cuvier fall within the same cipha with Sir Mix-A-Lot? Baby Got Back. Steatopygia? Cuvier came with all his racist porno-tropes, gazing with those medical eyes that saw a collage of "abnormal" buttocks and genitalia. Big ups to Sarah Bartmann. They called her "Hottentot Venus." Josephine Baker knew how to work it. Sistas know Cosmo ain representin. Big ups to the sistas who realize that aesthetics is political. The Sistas got some high standards, too. They ain no skeezers. You know you gotta show respect. Industry funded, paid for images got U hooked, Brotha. Believin all that hype, throwin all that chedda, tryin to bling bling yo way to a piece of that pie. Do I see Cuvier behind yo gaze? Brothas gotta come real, his \*\*\*\* gotta be tight, no wack raps allowed. It ain all bout the benjamins! Is it Johnny Walker Red or a forty-ounce? Let's pour a lil bit for the brothas who ain heah. Singin doo-wop in some back ally. That's the way it usta be. Or rappin, freestylin, on some urban street corner. Even the Hawk, you know, Joe Chilly, don't stop these Brothas from talkin that talk. Yo, you gotta represent. The power of Nommo within these tight, fluctuatin, surreal, invitin and dangerous streets can save yo life. Ask Malcolm, not X, but Little. He was out there. You know, my man Detroit Red. He was tryin to make [End Page 280] that chedda. The trickster. You've got to be improvisational on these chocolate city streets, constantly in existential negotiation, takin no shorts. In these streets, somethin always bout to kick off. It's summahtime and brothas be rollin tough, posse-style. Many, they be frontin, though. Whether duping Mister Charlie, ole Massa, or The Man, Black folk be flippin the script. The power of improvisatorial negotiation. Thelonius Monk, he is a child of the first twenty Africans to arrive. The Middle Passage. Negotiating. Creating. Makin somethin outta nothin. Learning how to play those microtones and enact those microdisturbances of white hegemonic power. Black folk bees some BaddDDD people, all decked out in their marvelousness, their terribleness, contradictoriness, pains and pleasures. Ask DMX, he know WHO WE BE. From Africa to America, Black people bees tellin stories within stories. The African Griot. Field holler. A Blues song. A Jazz improvisation. Reb in the house! Revolutionary politico-poetics. Rap music. Big Momma's linguistic and paralinguistic style. And you know she got much Mother-wit. This is a complex, continuous, and contiguous historical cipha. The power of Nommo as both constant and constative. Sonia Sanchez shonuff knows this; Larry Neal and surrealist Ted Joans still knows it; and Amiri Baraka's vociferations tell it all. Yo, Docta G, kick the ballistics: The emergence of the Black Freedom Struggle marked a fundamental shift in linguistic consciousness as Black intellectuals, scholar-activists, and writer-artists deliberately and consciously engaged in an unprecedented search for a language to express Black identity and the Black condition. (Smitherman 2000, 4) The entire cadre of the Black Arts Movement knew a change had to come. This ain just braggadocio, though we can do that, too. You smell me? Hips in motion with some serious attitude. Deconstructed linearity. Cakewalking, Swinging (just to stay alive), bopping, grooving, hip hopping, and Harlem shakin. Cool and hot expressiveness ever so fused. Talkin \*\*\*\*. Sometimes wino-style. Richard Pryor had a comedic-dramatic feel for all this marvelous Black everydayness; he was all up in the Lebenswelt of Black folk. Playin some craps. Heah come the PO-ice! Multiple sites of keepin it real: the Amen corner, barbershops, hair salons, the safe space of the kitchen, pool halls, clubs, street corners, and back allies. Cell phones and pagers in this postmodern urban space. Boody call. "It's my shorty, I gotta go. Shoot some hoops later. Peace out." "\*\*\*\*, dog, I think you must be whupped." These are the speech acts of everydayness, the lingua franca of so many of my peeps. But not everything is linguistically permissible within this space. Within the framework of speech act theory, there are definite felicity conditions. Black people be movin in that rich semiotic space, suspended and immersed in webs of meaning, as Max Weber and Clifford Geertz would say. You might ask, why the delineation of the above culturally thick, multiply semiotic, and intertextually rich streams? Answer: Docta G's work demands it! She writes: [End Page 281] In my own work, I have very consciously sought to present the whole of Black Life, and the rich continuum of African American speech from the secular semantics of the street and the basketball court to the talkin and testifyin of the family reunion and the Black Church. (Smitherman 2001, 8) This cultural space is thick, hypertextual, protean, and diachronic. It is a cultural semiotic tale, a narrative force, told and lived by a people who, despite their horrendous experiences during the Middle Passage, the failures of Reconstruction, the presence of lynched Black bodies (or strange fruit), the water hoses, and "\*\*\*\*\*\* dogs" during the sixties, see it as they duty to keep keepin on, keepin their "eye on the sparrow," and gittin ovuh. That's right: AND STILL WE RISE! Docta G knows that "\*\*\*\*\*\*\* is more than deleted copulas" (58). To get a clear sense of the diachronic structure of AAL, it is important to understand the historicity and dynamic remaking of African folk in racist America; indeed, there is the need to be fully cognizant of what America bees puttin Black folk through. As I have suggested, Docta G is hip to the particular forms of life of so many African Americans. She is all up in the epistemological, ontological, and cultural "language-gaming" of Black folk, from the pulpit, within the everyday urban and rural spaces of African American linguistic performativity, to the complexity and aesthetics of talkin \*\*\*\*, to rapese. She recognizes that it is not simply an issue of getting at the lexical core of what makes AAL unique and legitimate, but it is an issue of "whose culture?" and "whose values?" and "whose identity?" Peep the insightful lines where she elaborates, "The moment is not which dialect, but which culture, not whose vocabulary but whose values, not I vs. I be, but WHO DO I BE?" (66). It is a question of the axiological, linguistic, and cultural ontology of identity. But to get at "WHO DO I BE" involves moving beyond the discourse of pathology and what W. E. B. Du Bois referred to as our being defined as a problem vis-à-vis white folk. Therefore, Docta G is engaged in a project that is fueled by depathologization, celebration, and reclamation of African American humanity and identity. In sum, then, Ima have to continue writin a responsible article that captures the broad scope of what Docta G bees droppin. At this juncture, I will briefly explore, in an expository, synthetic, and interpretive fashion, various aspects of Docta G's critical corpus: (1) the significance of the existentially terrifying journey from Africa, through the Middle Passage, and to the so-called New World, which will provide historical insight into the psycholinguistic rupture, though not resulting in a complete cultural severance, caused by the malicious regime of white racism; (2) the significance of Nommo or the Word for Africans in America, and how Nommo is linked to the protean and resistant/resilient power of African/African American identity; and, (3) the structure of AAL in terms of significant lexical, phonological, stylistic, and semantic features, and what this means in terms of resisting/combating Euro/Anglo linguistic imperialism and hegemony. [End Page 282] Throughout Docta G's critical oeuvre she makes constant reference to 1619. For example, she notes: The first cargo of African slaves to be deposited in what would become the United States of America arrived at Jamestown in 1619. From that point until the beginnings of the movement to abolish slavery in the nineteenth century, whites, by and large, perceived of America's African slave population as beasts of burden, exotic sexual objects, or curious primitives. (70) In short, within the epistemological regime of white racism, these Africans were not different, but were deemed as constituting an ontological deficiency (71). "We are trapped," according to Docta G, "in our own historical moment and wish to understand that" (113). In order to understand this historical moment, however, and Docta G is well-aware of this, Black folk must understand their historical journey across space and time. It involves the narrative of Black folk's "unfinished business of what it means to be and talk like home" (Smitherman 2000, 113). Again, back to the connection between ontology, identity, and language. Docta G agrees with Fanon that white colonialism forces Black folk to question their sense of identity: "Who am I?"(Smitherman 2001, 317). After all, the institution of American and European slavery, with its disciplinary strategies and practices, was designed to instill in Africans a sense of inferiority and ontological servitude, to deracinate any sense of African pride, cultural identity, and home. This motif of "home" has been a rich trope for Black folk in America; for in their various stages of identity formation (African, Colored, Negro, Black, African American) they have sought ways of negotiating a sense of themselves and a sense of place and reality. Docta G writes, "The societal complexity of the Black condition continues to necessitate a self-conscious construction of reality" (43). Africans were taught to internalize negative images of themselves, to "know" themselves as chattel and property. This process was evident during the Middle Passage. During the voyage, Africans (Ashantis, Ibos, Fulanis, Yorubas, Hausas, and others) were subjected to tight forms of spatialization. The Middle Passage was itself part and parcel of a disciplinary practice to construct the Black body/self as a thing, to encourage Africans to begin thinking of themselves in subhuman terms. Black bodies were herded into suffocating spaces of confinement. Think here of the physically tight, economically impoverished spaces of contemporary urban Black America. On the slave ship Pongas, for example, 250 women, many of whom were pregnant, were forced into a space of 16 by 18 feet. Feminist and cultural theorist bell hooks writes: The women who survived the initial stages of pregnancy gave birth aboard the ship with their bodies exposed to either the scorching sun or the freezing cold. The number of black women who died during childbirth or the number of [End Page 283] stillborn children will never be known. Black women with children on board the slave ships were ridiculed, mocked, and treated contemptuously by the slaver crew. Often the slavers brutalized children to watch the anguish of their mothers. (hooks 1981, 18-19) An African slave trader tells of 108 boys and girls who were packed into a small hole: I returned on board to aid in stowing [on the slave ship] one hundred and eight boys and girls, the eldest of whom did not exceed fifteen years [old]. As I crawled between decks, I confess I could not imagine how this little army was to be packed or draw breath in a hole but twenty-two inches high! (Asante 1995, 61) And Molefi Asante captures the terror of the Middle Passage where he writes: Imagine crossing the ocean abroad a small ship made to hold 200 people but packed with 1,000 weeping and crying men, women, and children. Each African was forced to fit into a space no more than 55.9 centimeters (22 inches) high, roughly the height of a single gym locker, and 61 centimeters (24 inches) wide, scarcely an arm's length. There were no lights aboard the ships, little food, and no toilet facilities. (59) The Middle Passage was a voyage of death, bodily objectification, humiliation, dehumanization, geographical and psychological dislocation. It was a process of cultural disruption, which involved a profound sense of religious, aesthetic, linguistic, teleological, and cosmological disorientation. In the "New World," we were sold from auction blocks; the Black body/self became a blood-and-flesh text upon which whites could project all of their fears, desires, ressentiment, fantasies, myths, and lies. For example, white fears and perversions created the myth of the so-called Negro rapist. In 1903, Dr. William Lee Howard argued that Negro males attack innocent white women because of "racial instincts that are about as amenable to ethical culture as is the inherent odor of the race" (Frederickson 1971, 279). In 1900, Charles Carroll supported the pre-Adamite beliefs of Dr. Samuel Cartwright. The Negro was described as an ape and was said to be the actual "tempter of Eve" (277). The so-called sciences of physiognomy and phrenology, with their emphasis on the prognathous jaw of Negroes, were said to clearly support the "primitive" nature of African people. In short, the Black body/self, within the scientific discursive space of whiteness, which embodied a racist epistemology, was constructed as a mere object of the white racist gaze. The Black body/self was subjected to the tactics of what philosopher Michel Foucault termed anatomo-politics, that is, those disciplines that operated on the body, regulating and subjecting the Black body/self [End Page 284] to white racist theorizations (Foucault 1990, 139). Docta G is well-aware of the historical existence of scientific racism where she notes: In the years just before the Civil War (roughly the 1840s and 1850s), scientific theories of racial superiority located social and behavioral differences between members of the human species in genetic factors, which became the basis of studies of black slaves. (Smitherman 2001, 71) Through the powerful structuration of the white gaze, the Black body/self was codified and typified as a subhuman, savage beast devoid of culture. Dr. Paul B. Barringer drew from the Darwinian emphasis on heredity. According to the insights of historian George M. Fredrickson, Barringer argued: The inborn characteristics of the Negro had been formed by natural selection during "ages of degradation" in Africa and his savage traits could not have been altered in any significant way by a mere two centuries of proximity to Caucasian civilization in America. (Fredrickson 1971, 256) The historian Joseph A. Tillinghast also theorized within the framework of Darwinian theory. For Tillinghast, "The Negro character had been formed in Africa, a region which supposedly showed an uninterrupted history of stagnation, inefficiency, ignorance, cannibalism, sexual licence, and superstition" (253). And Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76), in his "Of National Characters," maintains: I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. In Jamaica indeed they talk of one Negro as a man of learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly. (West 1999, 83) The idea was to "demonstrate" (though we know it was to rationalize white wicked deeds) that Africans had no language (perhaps a few words only), no history, no identity, and no peoplehood. But I/we must admit that them white boys was droppin some weak, mythical, indefensible, pseudoscientific \*\*\*\*. What is clear is that the newly arrived Africans found themselves in a hostile and dangerous world of anti-Blackness, a world that refused to recognize the complex cultural and subjective here from which Africans viewed the world and hated their captivity and oppression. "It was the practice of slavers to mix up Africans from different tribes" (Smitherman 1997, 7). Africans were forced into unfamiliar groupings so as to eliminate any sense of community, cultural, linguistic, or otherwise. The objective, despite, paradoxically, the racist [End Page 285] belief that Africans were devoid of any complex linguistic-communicative practices, was to prevent them from communicating, from gaining any sense of group identity, and, hence, suppressing any possibility of rebellion/overthrow. Consistent with Hume's belief that Africans spoke "a few words plainly," Docta G notes that in 1884, J. A. Harrison held that African American speech was "based on African genetic inferiority" (Smitherman 2001, 72). For Harrison, much of Negro talk was "baby-talk" (72). Docta G concludes: Blinded by the science of biological determinism, early twentieth-century white linguistic scholars followed Harrison's lead, taking hold of his baby-talk theory of African American speech and widely disseminating it in academic discourse. The child language explanation of Black Language is linguistic racism that corresponds to the biological determinist assumption that blacks are lower forms of the human species whose evolution is incomplete. (73) Such beliefs, however, were not limited to white racist "academics." As African American linguist and anthropologist John Baugh correctly points out: The racist literature about blacks and black speech in particular should, of course, be dismissed in any serious analysis of the subject, but we must appreciate that the opinions expressed by white supremacists—while often absurd—reflected the feelings of a majority of white Americans. (Baugh 1983, 14) Finding themselves within this colonial context, a space of white supremacy (read: anti-Blackness), what were Africans to do? Torn from their own rich soil, and transplanted within this blood-soaked soil of America, Africans, with their magnificent oral tradition, rich cultural modes of being, non-white constructions of reality, and their own conception of what it meant to be, had to make sense out of this imposed and absurd situation. They had to survive the existential horror and meaninglessness of white America. "But that is the essence of the Black experience: to make a way out of no way" (Smitherman 2001, 240). Keep in mind that American slavery was also reinforced through the use of nondiscursive forms of brutality and oppression. It wasn't all about white racist abstract theory. Frederick Douglass knew all too well of the physical horrors of plantation life. He was torn from his mother at a very young age. The idea here was to eliminate any sense of biological and familial continuity, to attempt to break the spirit of oneness. In terms of sheer physical brutality, Douglass, who Docta G groups within the Black intellectual tradition of W. E. B. Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, and Lorenzo Turner, given his understanding of the rich oral/aural tradition of Black people, tells of the story of old Barney receiving thirty lashes on his Black flesh by Colonel Lloyd (Douglass 1993, 49). He tells of Demby, who disobeyed an order given by Mr. Gore and was shot in the head as a result. Douglass says that "his mangled body sank out of sight, [End Page 286] and blood and brains marked the water where he had stood" (52). Or, think of the young Black girl, Douglass' wife's cousin, who had fallen asleep while watching Mrs. Hick's baby. Mrs. Hick "jumped from her bed, seized an oak stick of wood by the fireplace, and with it broke the girl's nose and breastbone, and thus ended her life" (53). To be enslaved was to be subjected to terror. You had your teeth knocked out, you were permanently separated from your family, burned to death, castrated, lynched; you watched your mother or sister raped, beaten, and shackled. This was an everyday reality and a constant live possibility for Africans bought to the "New World." But this is the historical space that must be explored, if only briefly, to understand the force of our languaging. Docta G is mindful of this: "I say ... we can not talk about Black Idiom apart from Black culture and the Black experience" (Smitherman 2001, 57) Continuing with Douglass, Smitherman locates a significant aspect of our oral, aural, musical, and narrative motifs, viz., the use of song as a counterhegemonic expression. These Black bodies, locked down, with very little space within which to move, must have had rich (Ghanaian, Dahomeyan, etc.) musical fire shut up in they bones. Memory. Retentions. Identity. Douglass dispels the false notion that enslaved Africans were "happy darkies" who sung their time away. Indeed, on the contrary, singing, which was a powerful semiotic marker of our enduring ability to create visions of counterreality, solidarity, memory, and agency, was an illocutionary form of expression, communicating discontentment and protestation, which had a significant perlocutionary impact on the psychology of the enslaved. Douglass: The songs of the slave represent the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears ... [the songs] told a tale of woe ... they were tones loud, long, and deep; they breathed the prayer and complaint of souls boiling over with the bitterest anguish. Every tone was a testimony against slavery, and a prayer to God for deliverance from chains.... To those songs I trace my first glimmering conception of the dehumanizing character of slavery.... Those songs still follow me, to deepen my hatred of slavery, and quicken my sympathies for my brethren in bonds. (Smitherman 1977, 48-49) Hence, even our "musicking" was a form of communication. But there were times when we had to code our language from the ofay. This is just one, though very important, semantic register of the Africans creation of a counterlanguage (Smitherman 2001, 19). Docta G points to an example of a stanza from an old Black folk song that includes the expression "not turn her." This was a brilliant coded way of referring to the revolutionary freedom fighter "Nat-Tur-ner." Docta G goes on to argue that many of the Negro spirituals were not speaking about other-worldly affairs, but about the historically concrete affairs of Black people, in the here and now of their servitude. Hence, though the lyrics (overheard by [End Page 287] whites) suggested a vertical metaphysics that spoke to God, the lyrics contained a powerful social and political horizontal message that spoke to the urgency of escape. Docta G: The slaves used other-worldly lyrics, yes, but the spirituals had for them this-worldly meanings [What I be callin a "horizontal message."]. They moaned "steal away to Jesus" to mean stealing away FROM the plantation and TO freedom (that is, "Jesus"). They sang triumphantly "this train is bound for Glory," but the train they were really talking about was the "freedom train" that ran on the Underground Railroad. The symbolic Underground Railroad was actually a revolutionary network of escape routes and schemes devised to assist slaves fleeing to the "glory" of freedom in Canada and the North. "Go down, Moses, and tell Ole Pharaoh to let my people go." Moses—black freedom fighter Harriet Tubman, the "conductor" of the Underground Railroad, who in her lifetime assisted more than 300 slaves to escape. She would "go down" South and by her actions "tell" white slavers (Ole Pharaoh) to let her people go. (Smitherman 1977, 48) This is one example of what I mean by the dynamics of linguistic resistance. Africans were able to use the language of white folk, curving it, warping it, and twisting it against them. This was/is a form of linguistic resistance/combat and overthrow. In yo face style. Swish, two points! Docta G notes: When an enslaved African said, "Eve'body talkin bout Heaben ain goin dere," it was a double-voiced form of speech that signified on the slaveholders who professed Christianity but practiced slavery. This Africanized form of speaking became a code for Africans in America to talk about Black business, publicly or privately, and in the enslavement period, even to talk about "ole Massa" himself right in front of his face! (Smitherman 2001, 19) Of course, when the ofay caught on, Black folk had to change the word, expression. We talkin bout a dynamic process heah. Concerning the two-pronged dimensions of language, Ngugi wa Thiong'o argues: Every language has two aspects. One aspect is its role as an agent that enables us to communicate with one another in our struggle to find the means for survival. The other is its role as a carrier of the history and the culture built into the process of that communication over time. (Thiong'o 1993, 30) Thiong'o sees these two aspects of language as forming a kind of dialectical unity. Despite the long journey across the Middle Passage, one way that Africans were able to negotiate ways of surviving was through dynamic semiotic [End Page 288] and linguistic modalities, to communicate with one another (in Pidgin and Creole) in a common struggle to stay alive. As Marlene Nourbese Philip notes: In the vortex of New World slavery, the African forged new and different words, developed strategies to impress her experience on the language. The formal standard language was subverted, turned upside down, inside out, and sometimes erased. Nouns became strangers to verbs and vice versa; tonal accentuation took the place of several words at a time; rhythms held sway. (Potter 1995, 57) Africanized "Standard" American English also functioned as a medium of Black culture and reminded Black folk of the historicity of their African identity. Hence, the complete cultural rupture that was intended for enslaved Africans simply failed. "Using elements of the white man's speech, in combination with their own linguistic patterns and practices, enslaved Africans developed an oppositional way of speaking" (Smitherman 2001, 19). I see this as a dynamic process of sublation, which understands the African experience in America as a process of negation and preservation. No matter how much of WHO WE BE was negated, through a disruptive and colonialist "synthesis," we preserved significant and powerful elements of our rich historical past. Hallelujah, thank the Lord! Yes, we got soul and we SUPER BAD! Soul, according to Docta G, involves "a world view that is not only God-centered, but includes the vision that Goodness and Justice is gon prevail" (344). She links soul with the dynamic philosophical category of style, which is rich with aesthetic, political, and ontological overtones. In other words, style is the dynamic expression or articulation of the motif of overcoming. She concludes: "If you got soul, yo style oughta reflect it" (344). But whassup wit all dis philosophical talk? Well, it's bout Black folk. Their linguistic preservation and combativeness constitutes their style, which is deeply reflective of their souls. Yes, the souls of Black folk. Du Bois be down wit it. Therefore, we need to move within that space of soul and style where our collective languaging is a commentary on both. Contrary to the white colonialist view, **Africans did not get off that Dutch ship in Jamestown without any sense of identity and culture as manifested in and structured through language**. The many millions that were brought over in chains after 1619 also arrived with their nuanced **cultural practices and religious worldviews** as **mediate**d **through unique linguistic rules and styles**. As homo narrans (creators of their own meaningful oral narrative existence) and homo significans (creators of signs and symbols that ordered their reality), Africans already had their language and hence their own theory of reality. On this score, language is the medium through which reality is constructed. **Language**, then**, shapes the contours of** one's **metaphysics**. **Africans had to feel a profound sense of cognitive and metaphysical dissonance within the white** colonial order of things in **America**, with its strange language, and hence, it’s imposing and extraneous view of reality. As Docta G reminds us, "Language represents a society's theory of reality. It not only reflects that theory of reality, it explains, interprets, constructs, and reproduces that reality." Although Docta G thinks that the Whorfian’s (followers of B.L. Whorf) overstate the importance of language vis-a-vis the construction of reality, she maintains: **Reality is not merely socially, but socio-linguistically** constructed. Real world experience and phenomena do not exist in some raw, undifferentiated form. Rather, reality is always filtered, apprehended, encoded, codified, and conveyed via some linguistic shape. So as to clarify the sociolinguistic "determinist" implications of Docta G's position, it is important to note that she does not say that consciousness and ideology are supervenient on sociolinguistic factors. She is careful to say that it is her "contention that **ideology and consciousness are** largely [my emphasis] **the products of** what I call the **'sociolinguistic construction of reality**." Attempting **to understand** the new colonial reality within the framework of their understanding of **Nommo**, the power of the word, **black folk had to feel** a sense of double consciousness or what Docta G refers to as **the phenomenon of "linguistic push-pull**." Through the power of Nommo, Black folk performatively spoke (and continue to speak) a new reality and a new sense of identity into existence. **Crossing the horror of the Middle Passage** - which could take anywhere from 35 to 90 days, and having to contend with feces, lice, fleas, rats, disease, and dying black bodies - **failed to break the power of the African spirit; failed to silence the power of Nommo, which said "NO!" to white imperialism, "NO!" to white cultural hegemony, "NO!" to colonial brainwashing, and "NO!" to linguistic-cultural dispossession**. There was a "deep structural" cultural awareness that the word can radically alter the world. Docta G notes: the oral tradition, then, is part of the cultural baggage the African brought to America. The pre-slavery background was one in which the concept of Nommo, the magic power of the Word, was believed necessary to actualize life and give man mastery over things. She further notes: In traditional African culture, a newborn child is a mere thing until his father gives and speaks his name. No medicine, potion, or magic of any sort is considered effective without accompanying words. So strong is the African belief in the power and absolute necessity of Nommo that all craftsmanship must be accompanied by speech. **Nommo is an essential ontological register of WHO WE BE.** Nommo is capable of concretizing the black spirit in the form of action, action that is necessary within the framework of a contentious and oppressive alien cultural environment. It was imperative that Diasporic Africans create syncretistic consttructions of reality vis-à-vis "deep structural linguistic-cultural (African) patterns and practices acting as the general framework through which new cultural elements were absorbed, synthesized, and reconfigured. This process is less like a Kuhnian paradigm shift and more like a form of "adaptive fusion." It is a fusion (don't let the jazz motif pass you by) that bespeaks the ability of black folk to keep keepin’ on in the face of oppression and white terror. This process of fusion is indicative of the fact that black live their lives within a subjunctive (indicative of our possibilities) ontological mode of existence. Docta G observes that African American Language (or what she also refers to as a black English, black idiom, African American English, African Americans and the continuing quest for freedom." Given the emphasis on the power of Nommo and the sheer protean and meta-stable force of African linguistic-cultural, psychological and existential endurance, what then is AAL? The Docta is worth quoting in full: THE EBONICS SPOKEN in the US is rotted in the Black American Oral Tradition, reflecting the combination of African languages (Niger-Congo) and Euro American English. It is a language forged in the crucible of enslavement, US-style apartheid, and the struggle to survive and thrive in the face of domination. Ebonics is emphatically not "broken" English, nor "sloppy" speech. Nor is it merely "slang." Nor is it some bizarre form of language spoken by baggy-pants-wearing Black youth. Ebonics is a set of communication patterns and practices resulting from Africans' appropriation and transformation of a foreign tongue during the African Holocaust.

### 1NC – Topicality

#### Antitrust law’ excludes subsets but includes enforcement.

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

#### Violation- the plan only expands the scope of antitrust laws for mergers, not every area.

#### Vote neg:

#### Limits- allowing any subset o antitrust laws to be topical- explodes the topic to infinite number of aff’s that makes the research burden for the neg too large

#### Ground- allowing subset affs encourages teams to find the smallest possible 1AC’s that access the largest possible impacts.

### 1NC – Innovation

#### Whiteness is an existential threat— (let’s just do the extinction debate here)

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

#### The presumption that markets can be post-racial as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### Black abjection is the root cause of capitalism---AND even if class struggle preceded slavery, fungibility shapes contemporary markets

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 980-981)

W. E. B. Du Bois suggested the white worker’s choice and the black slave’s absence of choice were important components of the capitalistic distinction between blackness and whiteness. Du Bois argued white workers always held out hope that “they themselves might also become planters by saving money, by investment, by the power of good luck.”71 Black slaves come into existence not as exploited, which is to say “free” to sell their labor (choice), but expropriated in ways that mirror the extraction of natural resources.72 Another way to say this is that the slave, much like the tree or cattle, for Frank Wilderson,73 is the ground on which human capitalist exploitation stands. Julia Ott’s comprehensive review of research on slave capital bears this out: the transatlantic slave trade and slave-based Southern US commodity production created modern capitalism, financing transformations in technology, industry, and economy more thoroughly than any other capital input.74

Ian Baucom explains the connection between the objecthood of black slave bodies and the economic rationality of finance.75 According to Baucom, it was the transatlantic slave trade that birthed the modern financial calculation of value through insurance on slaves. The value of slave bodies as chattel, which could, if circumstances demanded, be cast overboard from a slave ship facing turbulent seas, was guaranteed in advance for the owners of slave ships by insurance policies. The calculation of the cost of that insurance was a foundational form of what Baucom variously terms “actuarial historicism” or “theoretical realism,” which are forms of rationality that “ground value in the loss of the singular and the invention of the average.”76 In other words, insurance on slave bodies evacuated their singularity more completely even than enslavement, rendering them placeholders of value, which could be converted into paper money either through exchange or through the exercise of an insurance contract once they were cast overboard. For Baucom, the modern credit economy and finance capitalism itself are founded on the reification of speculative values that the insured transatlantic trade in black slaves inaugurated. In his formulation, it is the white slave trader or actuary who can see through the “thingliness” of the objects of slavery to calculate their speculative value, embodying the “speculative culture of finance capital” that has much in common with the economic rationality invoked in the calculation of the abstract cost of “free” checking accounts, despite their very real lived costs for poor customers.77

These dynamics did not end with slavery. The twentieth century is rich with examples of outerdetermined black objecthood within capitalism.78 The 1939 Federal Housing Authority Underwriting Manual that served as both guide and tool for suburbanization in the US not only ratified the practice of “redlining” whereby neighborhoods of black families were drawn out of mortgage lending, but actually directed homeowners to use racial covenants to prevent black people from moving into their neighborhoods.79 Both redlining and racial covenants acted on black homeowners and potential buyers, making them objects to be circumscribed and excluded. They also prevented black people from becoming privileged subjects of the American mortgage boom, which was built and protected for those consumers who fit within the racialized subject position of homo economicus.

#### Their critique of capitalism/neoliberalism continues anti-blackness – The assumption of the universality of capital’s impact ignores the differential effects of capital on black bodies

Woods 7 (Tryon Woods, professor of criminal justice at Sonoma State University, PhD in the Department of Criminology, Law & Society from UC Irvine, Summer 2007, “The Fact of Anti-Blackness: Decolonization in Chiapas and the Niger River Delta,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* Volume 5 Issue 3, modified, pg. 319-320)

This article considers Frantz Fanon’s interrogation of the fact of anti-blackness in light of the ongoing decolonization struggles in our current historical moment. 3 Debt regimes, structural adjustment, neoliberal military-prison industrial complexes, and corporate impunity are some of the idioms of power through which colonialist legacies and imperialist desires live today. The anti-globalization and anti-war movements have developed eloquent critiques of the vagaries of neo-liberalism, including the machinations of corporate media and the omnipresence of market relations. By obscuring the black’s singular relation to suffering, however, these important challenges serve to reconstitute the anti-black world. To make it plain: when critiques of globalization, such as those proffered by the Zapatistas out of southern Mexico, speak of solidarity with all peoples injured and threatened with extinction by neo-liberalism, they do nothing to undo the Manichean world Fanon shows us. In this “Manichean delirium,” the Black is overdetermined from the outside; to use Nigel Gibson’s formulation of Fanon, the “Black is body and the body’s death is death**”** (2003: 20). In other words, black people experience bodily punishment; they are imprisoned, harassed, beaten, or murdered; criminalized, stigmatized, tortured or killed; impoverished, diseased, exiled, or homeless not because of a particular political economy, nor because of national oppression or underdevelopment. They are not hunted down because they have organized themselves militarily to resist state violence and the designs of capita**l** for the exploitation of their lands, as in the case of the Zapatista Rebellion, the most prominent social movement currently active in Chiapas. Rather, they are subjected to premature death because they are black, and as such, they are the violence that must be countered and expunged.

#### Kupachan is a series of alt causes

Kupchan, 21 – Georgetown University international affairs professor  
[Charles A. Kupchan, CFR senior fellow, served on the National Security Council during the Obama administration, and Peter L. Trubowitz, London School of Economics and Political Science IR professor, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, “The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021, accessed 6-23-21]

To put the interests of working families at the table, Biden should make the U.S. secretary of labor a permanent member of the National Security Council, like the secretary of the treasury. Doing so would give factory workers, farm hands, and service workers a stronger voice in White House deliberations over foreign policy. Biden should also create senior deputy positions on the NSC and in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and other foreign policy agencies to ensure that the needs of American workers are considered early and often in the policymaking process. The Biden administration should also deepen the institutional links among the NSC and the offices dealing with the home front, such as the National Economic Council and the Domestic Policy Council. The administration could establish a weekly meeting of an interagency policy committee on economic security, co-chaired by the NSC, the NEC, and the DPC.

Washington also needs a new approach to trade adjustment—that is, the steps the government takes to mitigate the negative effects (reduced wages, lost jobs) that trade deals inevitably have on many workers. Currently, Washington offers displaced workers counseling, retraining, tuition, and other forms of support through a program known as Trade Adjustment Assistance. The program is too reactive, however, since it helps workers only after companies have shuttered factories or laid off employees. Moreover, TAA fails to address labor-market disruptions caused not by trade or globalization but rather by technological change. By training workers in new skill sets and making public investments in health care, education, and government services, Biden can create more jobs that are less susceptible to displacement through automation or trade. The administration also needs to redress the community-level effects of job loss, which include economic stagnation, population decline, substance abuse, and increased crime and violence. One possible model is the Pentagon’s Defense Economic Adjustment Program, which supports economic diversification in communities adversely affected by military base closures or defense program cancellations.

These reforms would pay off for years to come, making it more likely that Washington would aggressively enforce U.S. domestic trade laws, use existing international forums such as the World Trade Organization to ensure fairer trade, and pursue policies on taxes, procurement, the environment, infrastructure, and worker development that would make American businesses and workers more resilient and competitive. Implementing these improvements now, early in the administration, would increase the chances that Biden’s successor would keep them in place, regardless of which party holds the White House. In an age of populism, the next president will see little political advantage in rolling back reforms that promote the interests of American workers.

FIX THE SENATE

Biden can further shore up the domestic foundations of U.S. statecraft by bringing strategic priorities back into alignment with political means. The Biden administration should reduce U.S. commitments in the Middle East by continuing to downsize the American military footprint in the region; the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced little good. In the meantime, Biden should return to the time-tested touchstone of U.S. statecraft: working with allies to defend democracy and promote stability in Asia and Europe. To that traditional agenda, Biden should add a new focus on combating and adjusting to climate change, promoting global health, and maintaining the U.S. edge in technological innovation.

This strategic realignment is not only good policy—it is also good politics. Roughly three-quarters of American voters want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq. In contrast, staying put in Asia and Europe alongside democratic allies enjoys strong public support. NATO wins solid backing from voters of both major U.S. political parties. Democrats and Republicans also agree on the need to take a firm line toward China, and the Biden administration is on solid political footing in strengthening ties to partners in the Indo-Pacific, affirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, and encouraging the world’s democracies to “decouple” from China when it comes to sensitive technologies. The American public also prioritizes addressing climate change and global health.

Biden can build further support for a new internationalist consensus by making significant investments in the domestic economy that raise living standards, reduce inequality, and restore the social contract. In taking on that task, Biden cannot afford to wait for bipartisan agreement in Congress, which is unlikely to emerge in an intensely polarized Washington. Biden’s agenda will require ambitious and expensive legislation the likes of which the United States has not seen since the New Deal. To get it through, Biden and his allies in Congress will need to overhaul the archaic filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate. Many observers claim that the filibuster promotes consensus by forcing the two parties to find common ground. In truth, however, the filibuster rarely has that effect: often, it simply serves to kill legislation passed by the House. By forcing the majority party to assemble a supermajority of 60 votes to pass most laws, the filibuster allows the minority to block bills, including those that enjoy broad popular support. To liberate policy from the grips of this manufactured gridlock, Biden should urge Senate Democrats to ditch the filibuster outright or significantly reform it so that Congress can get back to the business of passing needed laws.

Biden and his allies in Congress need to overhaul the archaic filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate.

Republicans will cry foul. But they scrapped the filibuster in 2017 when it came to pushing through the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. If doing away with the filibuster makes sense when it comes to the justice system, surely it also makes sense for rebuilding the economy and guaranteeing the nation’s security. Moreover, scrapping the current supermajority requirement might actually increase bipartisanship in the long run. By advancing policies that are popular with the broader electorate, presidents would, over time, be able to once again garner support from the minority party. Consider, for example, Roosevelt’s success in securing bipartisan backing. He was able to win over numerous Republican members of Congress because they hailed from states that found much to like in the New Deal and the economic benefits of liberal internationalism.

Following Roosevelt’s lead, Biden can reawaken bipartisanship through strategic public investment, using the $2 trillion “Build Back Better” infrastructure proposal he campaigned on to bridge the urban-rural divide that reinforces political paralysis and widens partisan divisions. Extending broadband networks to rural areas would promote more equitable economic growth and wider civic engagement. Repairing the nation’s ailing bridges, roads, and mass transit systems would spur growth in metropolitan areas. Transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy would create millions of new jobs and boost U.S. competitiveness in lagging sectors. By targeting infrastructure and climate investments, Biden can spark private-sector engagement in the right places and help reduce economic inequality. Strategic investments at home will also yield payoffs abroad by spurring high-tech innovation as geopolitical competition plays out over climate change, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.

WALK THE WALK

Another way to shore up support for internationalism is to repair the American brand by standing up for democracy and human rights around the world. Partners abroad join most Americans in welcoming Biden’s efforts to put the United States back on the right side of history. But to make good on that goal, the United States must exhibit at home the values it seeks to promote abroad.

During the 1950s, segregation and racial discrimination eroded U.S. credibility abroad, especially in the developing world. The passage of the watershed 1964 Civil Rights Act did not silence the United States’ most vocal foreign critics, but it did make it easier for Washington to promote social justice beyond its borders. The Trump era, in contrast, seriously compromised American moral authority. Trump’s nativistic appeals exacerbated racial tensions, and his refusal to accept the outcome of the 2020 election constituted an assault on the institutions and norms of American democracy. By the time hundreds of Trump’s supporters launched a violent attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, the country’s image among foreign partners had already sunk to historic lows.

In the aftermath of these events, Biden will have to couple his defense of democracy abroad with political reform at home if he is to avoid charges of hypocrisy. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s proposal to establish a bipartisan, independent commission to probe the attack on the Capitol is a strong step in the right direction and one that Biden has sensibly endorsed. The commission’s charge should include getting to the bottom of what led to the insurrection and why security provisions at the Capitol were so inadequate. In addition, it should address how to prevent bogus challenges to the certification of future elections and propose wide-ranging reforms to strengthen the country’s electoral procedures, including the management of the transfer of power.

The United States must exhibit at home the values it seeks to promote abroad.

The United States should also begin repairing its increasingly unrepresentative electoral system. Passing the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act would reverse years of federal and state efforts to restrict access to voting for minority, elderly, and disabled citizens. That bill should move forward alongside the omnibus legislation known as the For the People Act, which has passed the House and would make it harder for lawmakers to gerrymander voting districts in ways that reduce the representation of growing nonwhite populations. In the near term, the passage of those bills would clearly favor Democrats. Over the longer term, however, such legislation would strengthen U.S. democracy by incentivizing both parties to compete for the votes of all Americans.

Finally, Biden should encourage state-level initiatives to reform the way voters elect their representatives. Currently, most states hold separate, party-only primary elections. Amid today’s intense polarization, this system punishes moderates; to secure nomination, candidates cater to their ideological flanks instead of the political center. Alaska, following the lead of many established democracies around the world, is demonstrating how to reverse this dynamic. It has eliminated party primaries in favor of a single, open primary. The four candidates who receive the most votes will then move on to a general election in which voters will use a ranked-choice system to list the candidates from all parties, from most preferred to least preferred. If no candidate wins 50 percent of the first-choice votes, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated, and the second choices of voters for that candidate are then awarded those votes. The process is repeated until one candidate wins a majority. Ranked-choice voting is not a magic bullet. But because it incentivizes candidates to reach out to the largest possible number of voters, it could help detoxify the country’s political ecosystem.

**Conclusion of their article says the squo solves**

**Sasnal, 20** -- Polish Institute of International Affairs head of research   
[Patrycja, "Mistaking Panacea for Pathogens: The Case for Existential Multilateralism," Challenges of Global Governance Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 2020, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report\_pdf/challenges-of-global-governance-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic.pdf, accessed 8-18-20]

The majority of the global population only fears a handful of international threats. According to a Eurobarometer poll, the greatest EU concerns are immigration (34 percent), climate change (24 percent), the economic situation (18 percent), and terrorism (15 percent). According to a Pew survey, the top three concerns in Asia-Pacific and Latin America are cyberattacks, climate change, and terrorism. In most polls, Africans fear economic hardship the most, but the 2019 Afrobarometer also found that a majority think climate change is making their lives worse. According to an early Pew survey after the pandemic in the United States, Americans feared infectious diseases the most (79 percent) followed by terrorism (73 percent), nuclear weapons (73 percent), cyberattacks (72 percent), a rising China (62 percent), and climate change (60 percent).

These first-tier global challenges—climate change, terrorism, mass migration, infectious diseases, nuclear weapons, economic hardship, and cyberattacks—are not only substantively but also qualitatively different. That quality rests neither on the number of victims nor on the kind of perpetrator (state, individual, or natural) hut instead on the potential to threaten the **existence of humanity**. Three threats have this potential: climate change, highly infectious diseases, and nuclear weapons. Of course, abstract scenarios are easily imagined in which human existence is endangered because of a massive cyberattack, mass migration, or vicious artificial intelligence that leads to a **conflict in which nuclear weapons are used** and **humanity kills itself**. Such potential futures, though, require a chain of events, whereas the three existential menaces are present and direct. Unlike other threats, they are all global and equal. No community is immune from them or their aftermath. All three can reach a tipping point, after which the danger spirals out of control.

This set of existential threats is not conventionally recognized. The term existential threat has proliferated in political debates to mean anything across a spectrum of minor and major challenges: the opiate crisis to the policies of the Donald J. Trump administration. In twentieth-century politics, the expression was barely used despite the omnipresent danger of the nuclear bomb. For the past two decades, it has been mostly associated with terrorism. Terrorism, however, is not a threat to human existence—not even to Middle Easterners, where 95 percent of deaths from terrorist attacks occur. Classing mass migration as an existential threat is even more preposterous given how little insecurity migrants have brought to already stable host countries. Similarly, little suggests that inequality or economic hardship are existential threats, though their complex forms and far-reaching consequences render them categories of their own.

The distinction between existential and other international threats matters for multilateralism and global governance in light of the functional difference in the roles of the state in fighting them. The former can be taken on **only by international efforts**. Other concerns can be fought in other ways: a unilateral national decision to act internally or on another state; or a national bottom-up societal effort to reduce terrorism, disrupt cyber capabilities, or influence local migration patterns. Climate change, nuclear weapons, and infectious diseases, however, require global multilateral efforts to prevent their destructive potential from manifesting itself.

REVIVING TRUST IN INFORMATION AND SCIENCE

National responses to the pandemic have often been provisional—decisions of utmost importance to civil liberties are taken without proper argumentation or scientific judgment, because none is available. Not in living memory have governments watched each other as closely as now on decisions such as when and how to lock down and open societies and economies—at least in Europe. Since the pandemic, hunger for information and knowledge seems to have increased exponentially in international relations and the global public sphere because specific epidemiological expertise was needed—such that was available to only a few. Perhaps for the first time on such a scale, information is seen as directly correlated with human well-being. What scientists know about the virus—the way it is transmitted, how it mutates, how strong the antibodies are—is no longer seen as abstractly affecting our individual lives but directly affecting them.

The shortening of this perception chain is an opportunity for the scientific and analytical community to revive trust in experts by learning from the experience of life scientists. Medicine advanced as a result of interdisciplinary and international teams, and innovative fast publishing procedures (short communications and case reports). Given the importance of information to physical, political, and social life, further plans are being enacted to make scientific publications available for free, something social scientists should ponder as well.

The pandemic also exposes the weight of information in politics. First, information has been critical to assessing how effectively governments are responding to COVID-19. Without reliable statistical information from the health sector, it is impossible to analyze the scale of the pandemic, and therefore say anything about the measures authorities have taken. The Open Data Inventory 2018/19, which assesses the coverage and openness of official statistics, including health data, finds them open and covered only in Europe, North America, and a handful of other countries. Second, states have used the pandemic to spread propaganda and misinformation. China and Russia have a lot to answer for here by vilifying the European Union and the United States, as do Iran (which blamed the virus on the United States) and several Gulf states (which blamed Iran).

EXISTENTIAL MULTILATERALISM

The Indian novelist Arundhati Roy sees the pandemic as a portal between the old and new world. In international politics, this may translate into a passage from the post-1989 preoccupation with terrorism and economic growth based on consumption and exploitation to new existential politics. Little can be said about the future with certainty except that it **will face global existential threats**: climate change, infectious diseases, nuclear war. Because of the nature of these menaces, **they cannot be mitigated save by multinational**, informed, and expert **governance**.

Wyoming’s card ends

Such existential multilateralism can be championed by Europeans, whose regional system rests on multilateralism and who had recently intended to reinvigorate international cooperation by forming the Alliance for Multilateralism. The grouping should work toward making the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council recognize and prioritize the existential threat category. Europeans have also 19 masterminded the WHO Solidarity clinical trial initiative to find an effective treatment for COVID19. If successful, this project alone will do more good for global governance than a hundred UN General Assemblies.

#### Flaherty says there are too many alt causes and the political order is incapable of solving inequality

Flaherty, 21 – PhD candidate in Political Science, University of California, San Diego

[Thomas, and Ronald Rogowski, UCLA political science professor, "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order," International Organization, 75.2, 4-12-21, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/rising-inequality-as-a-threat-to-the-liberal-international-order/4CDE05DEB3AB076CE338E1AA4A9C8087, accessed 6-27-21]

The rise of top-heavy inequality—earnings concentration in a very thin layer of elites—calls into question our understanding of the distributional effects of the Liberal International Order. Far more people lose from globalization, and fewer gain, than traditional economic models suggest. We review three modern trade theories (neo-Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson or H-O-S-S, new new trade theory, and economic geography) that each arrive at the conclusion of top-heavy inequality by introducing some form of unit heterogeneity—an assumption that the actors we once treated as identical actually differ from one another in important ways. Heterogeneity allows the gains from globalization to concentrate in a narrow segment of workers with superlative talents, extraordinarily productive firms, or heavily agglomerated cities. An analysis of European voting data shows that shocks from trade and migration elicit populist opposition only where the top 1 percent have gained the most. With few politically feasible alternatives to protectionism, most notably the failure of democracies to redistribute income, our analysis predicts a persistence of public support for antiglobalization parties, especially those on the Right.

Presiding over the November 2016 meeting of the International Political Economy Society, which followed that year's US presidential election by only three days, David Lake began by saying, “To our theories, this result unfortunately comes as no surprise.” And indeed the field at large has believed that the growing “populist”1 backlash against the Liberal International Order (LIO)—not just the Trump victory but Brexit, the election of illiberal governments in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, the Philippines, and Brazil (to name only a few), and growing support for anti-immigrant and illiberal parties and candidates in many other democracies—has followed almost inevitably from the very changes the LIO has wrought, including of course increased trade and migration but also one major concomitant, rising economic inequality within states. According to our traditional economic theories,2 advanced and even middle-income countries are abundantly endowed with human capital, and poorly endowed with low-skill labor. And it is a rudimentary implication of international economics that, in those countries, expanded trade—or, even more, immigration of low-skill workers—will benefit the highly skilled and harm the less educated. Inequality will rise, and—perhaps the most prescient conclusion of the traditional analysis—partisanship will correlate increasingly with possession of human capital: opposition to the LIO will be strongest among the least educated and will decrease monotonically with more years of schooling.

The evidence, which we survey briefly, admits of no doubt that in almost all of the wealthier (and not a few semiwealthy) countries, inequality has risen, often quite sharply; returns on education3 have risen markedly; and education, even more than occupational status, has emerged as one of the most important predictors of electoral support for antiglobalization parties. What our theories however did not anticipate, and so far cannot explain, may well prove to have been even more important:

1. Not all who are well endowed in human capital, but chiefly a very thin upper layer—the top 1 percent, or even 0.1 percent—have harvested most of the gains from globalization.

2. The antiglobalization movements we observe

adopt a populist rhetoric that often excoriates not just globalization or immigration but also allegedly nefarious elites, who conspire, both domestically and across borders, to enrich each other at the expense of their fellow citizens;4

benefit chiefly parties of the radical Right; and

have in important cases attracted non-negligible support among university-educated segments of the electorate, albeit far less than among the less skilled.5

We suggest that the extreme inequality and the anomalies are related, and that some insights from recent work in international economics may help explain them. Three advances in trade theory predict extreme inequality. “New new” trade theory (NNTT), with its emphasis on superstar firms, offers a natural framework. So too does an “enriched” neo-H-O-S-S (Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson) perspective that explores how superstar workers arise in the context of heterogeneous talent.6 Finally, economic geography, explored thoroughly by Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth in this issue, shows how globalization gives rise to superstar cities.7 These three trade theories predict top-heavy inequality primarily by allowing for unit heterogeneity—an assumption that the actors our traditional theories treated as identical actually differ in important ways. Firms within sectors differ in productivity, workers within a factor class differ in innate talents, and regions within countries differ in agglomeration economies.

None of this suggests, of course, that rising inequality is the only, or even necessarily the most important, cause of the growing popular backlash against the LIO. Skill-biased technological innovation and resistance to cultural change also matter, as we discuss more fully later. We do find, however, at least from a cursory analysis of European elections, that backlash against shocks from immigration and imports is conditional on high inequality, disappearing where inequality is low; and we suspect that rising “top-heavy” inequality is related to a particularly prominent strain, within the antiglobalization movements, of anti-elite and anti-expert sentiment.

We go on to suggest why rising inequality matters, not only as a source of opposition to the LIO but as an impediment to economic growth and an exacerbant of domestic polarization and international conflict.

We assess the implications of top-heavy inequality for the LIO. What remedies have been proposed? And if they lack sufficient political support, what sources of resilience can sustain the LIO under top-heavy inequality? Relatedly, we return to the question of why antiglobalization sentiment has benefited the political Right more than the Left. Finally, we chart a course for future research on models of top-heavy inequality, and discuss how they illuminate “blind spots” in the literature on international political economy.

First, however, we survey briefly the extent of growing economic inequality in advanced economies and its seeming relation, chiefly through a human-capital channel, to antiglobalization and anti-elite attitudes and voting.

Convergence Across Countries, Divergence Within Them

The triumph of the LIO in the 1980s and 1990s—the collapse of Communism, the dismantling of trade barriers, the strengthening of institutions of international governance—coupled with, and facilitated by, breakthrough innovations in transport, communication, and finance, affected economic inequality in two ways that standard factor-endowment theories predicted: inequality declined significantly between countries, thus beginning to erode three centuries of the Great Divergence between rich and poor nations; but inequality within countries, especially among the advanced economies, increased almost as sharply.

Between countries. As late as 1990, the richest 10 percent of the world's population earned on average over ninety times what the poorest decile received; only twenty years later, that ratio had fallen to sixty-five times,8 or only slightly more than the within-country ratio of Brazil, where in 2008 the average income of the richest decile was about fifty times that of the poorest.9

Within countries. Beginning even earlier, inequality of incomes, whether measured as the Gini index or the share of total income accruing to the top decile, has risen in virtually all of the advanced economies,10 and indeed in many of the middle-income ones.11 Bourguignon notes that the collapse of the Soviet empire and the opening of China, India, and Latin America injected roughly “a billion workers, for the most part unskilled, into international competition.”12 That will have drastically lowered the global capital-labor ratio and hence further raised returns on human and physical capital, while reducing those on low-skill labor, in virtually all but the poorest, most labor-abundant countries.

In short, across much of the globe, the enormous overall gains from trade have benefited the highly skilled, the inventive entrepreneurs, and the owners of capital; the incomes of the less skilled and the capital-poor have risen more slowly, stagnated, or actually declined—exactly the development whose early manifestations alarmed Dani Rodrik two decades ago.13

Surely not all of the rise in inequality stems from globalization.14 Many analyses attribute much of the widening within-country gap—in the US, perhaps as much as four-fifths15—not to globalization but to skill-biased technological innovation.16 Bourguignon contends, to be sure, that innovation has been largely endogenous to globalization: wider markets and intensified competition have raised the returns on cost-reducing innovation.17 Cheaper labor, however, whether from offshoring or the competition of low-wage imports, might be expected to curtail the demand for labor-saving technologies, not to increase it.18 A stronger case is implied by “new new” trade theory: if managerial pay correlates closely with firm size, and if the most successful firms in a globalized economy tend to be the largest, it follows that globalization contributes directly to the rise in top incomes.19 Perhaps most importantly, however, whatever skill-biased innovation may have contributed to the gains of the top quintile or decile, it can say little about the gains of the top 1, or 0.1, percent of the distribution.20 Trade, as we argue, can more readily explain those disproportionate gains.

Rising Skills Premia

Also consistent with mainstream theory were the rising returns on education and the widening gap between high- and low-skill workers’ attitudes toward trade and migration. Exactly as theory would lead us to expect, antiglobalization sentiment rose sharply, and was increasingly concentrated, among voters with the least human capital—that is, the less educated.

Returns on education have indeed risen sharply. In the US in the 1970s, workers with a college degree earned only about a quarter more than ones of comparable ethnicity and age who had completed only high school; by 2010, that gap had risen to almost 50 percent.21 The “raw” difference in annual earnings (i.e., without controlling for ethnicity and age) between college graduates and those who have completed only high school is now 64 percent in the US, and on average in the OECD economies 45 percent.22

At the same time, less educated voters have mobilized strongly against globalization in almost all of the advanced economies. In the US, whites with less than a college education, having up to the year 2000 differed little in their partisanship from whites with university degrees, began to tilt Republican in the early 2000s23 and supported Trump in 2016 by a margin of more than two to one (64 to 28 percent).24 In the Brexit referendum, similarly, 70 percent of voters with only a General Certificate of Secondary Education, roughly equivalent to a US high-school diploma, supported leaving the European Union, while those with university degrees voted by almost the same margin (68 percent) to remain.25 And a recent International Monetary Fund working paper finds that since 2002 tertiary (i.e., university or equivalent) education has correlated, more than any other single variable, with not voting for a populist party in European parliamentary elections—an effect that has grown only stronger since 2012.26

The Riddle of the 1 Percent

In many ways, then, a standard factor-proportions picture of globalization's distributional and political effects holds up. What it cannot explain, as economists have by now noted repeatedly,27 is why so much of the bounty has gone to the top 1 percent and why even the remainder of the top decile, let alone the highly educated generally, have benefited comparatively little. This pattern is reflected in average real income trends since 1991 across five advanced economies (Figure 1). Much of the real income growth of the top 10 percent owes to gains by the top 1 percent (compare panels 1 and 2); the next 9 percent (i.e., the remainder of the top decile) have seen a comparatively paltry increase. At the same time, the incomes of next 9 percent, which stagnate or even decline after about 2000, mirror those of the middle 40 percent (compare panels 2 and 3). Taken together, the three panels demonstrate the extent to which a narrow elite has risen above the rest of society's otherwise skilled workers.

Haskel and colleagues more vividly make this case in the US with data on returns on education, finding that the median income of the top 1 percent had risen by 60 percent between 1990 and 2010, while the returns on university education, even for holders of advanced degrees, had declined in real terms after about 2000, virtually erasing their modest gains from the previous decade.28

The seemingly inexorable rise of the 1 percent, when contrasted with the relative stagnation of the rest of the top decile, and of owners of human capital in the middle 40 percent, raises at least three questions. Can our standard theories be modified to explain this “top-heavy” form of inequality? Would such a modified theory still provide a plausible link to globalization? And does such a theory help us understand the simultaneously anti-elitist and antiglobalization character of recent populist movements?

Heterogeneous Workers, Firms, and Regions: Three Ways Globalization Affects Top-Heavy Inequality

We argue that the top-heavy inequality we observe is consistent with three recent advances in trade theory. Each highlights how the bulk of globalization's gains concentrate in a narrow subset of superstar workers, superstar firms, or superstar cities. An “enriched” H-O-S-S model shows how globalization concentrates wages in a small share of highly talented workers. New new trade theory implies that globalization concentrates profits in a few multinational corporations. Finally, economic geography, extensively reviewed by Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth (in this issue), predicts that globalization concentrates economic growth in a few metropolitan regions.29 By producing far more extreme inequality than traditional models suggest, these theories may help explain the puzzling composition of antiglobalization interests and why these movements adopt a populist tone that demonizes elites.

In presenting these advances, we spare the reader their mathematical exposition and instead focus on their sometimes subtle intuitions. We then explore their similarities and differences, as well as how they illuminate the puzzles of LIO backlash.

Neo-H-O-S-S

The first advance injects new life into the increasingly disesteemed, yet still heavily used, factor-endowments framework of Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson. It turns out that modest enhancements introduced by Haskel and colleagues yield productive insights into the puzzles of LIO backlash.30 The key amendment introduces heterogeneous workers with varying degrees of innate talent. To state briefly the salient and surprising implications of that model, a drop in the relative price of labor-intensive goods, whether induced by globalization or by technology, can not only reduce the wages of low-skill workers, as in traditional models, but also distribute almost all of the resultant gains to a thin layer of highly talented people—and, at least as importantly, induce stagnation, or actual decline, in the earnings of highly skilled but less talented workers.31 And, once we observe that such a shift is both quite recent and plausibly linked to globalization, we may have shed some light on (a) the rabidly anti-elitist and antiglobalization tinge of the populist movements, (b) why such movements have recently peaked, and (c) why they gain (and may well continue to gain) support not only from the “usual suspects” among low-skill workers but also from those with moderate or even relatively high endowments of human capital.32

For those who appreciate a more rigorous introduction, we offer a graphical exposition of the “richer” H-O-S-S model in online Appendix A2. More intuitively, the key to understanding that model is what happens to high-skill workers when the relative price of capital rises.33 First consider the unsurprising fact that within most firms, sectors, and professions, some workers possess natural talent while the majority are perfectly average. Naturally, the most talented employees are far more productive than their average colleagues, even when everyone works with the same amount of capital. In Hollywood, for example, all actors may read the same script, but only A-list talent like Meryl Streep, Denzel Washington, or Tom Hanks can turn that script into an Oscar-winning performance.

In the classic model, trade lowers wages and raises the relative cost of capital; in the enriched model, the owners of capital make up for that higher cost by lowering the wages of mediocre employees and raising the wages of superstars. Capital owners become less able to afford mediocre workers whose productivity cannot keep up with rising capital costs. Instead, they hire the superstars, whose superior productivity can more than cover the increased costs of capital.

Consider the Hollywood example that Haskel and colleagues used, where film scripts represent intellectual capital, indeed the most important form of capital for the entertainment industry. As the world's tastes and purchasing power increase demand for Hollywood entertainment, the price of scripts rises—those of stellar scripts, most of all. As that price rises, studios or streaming services become less and less likely to hire actors of only middling quality to perform such a script. The studios’ investment in a high-quality script will pay off, and bring their film the requisite audience, only if it stars actors of extremely high talent: Robert Downey Jr., Scarlett Johansson, or Samuel L. Jackson (or all three in the same film!).34

Admittedly, this analysis assumes, rather than explains, that we can attribute the rise of the top 1 percent to differences in talent but a lot of evidence supports the thesis. For one thing, in almost all countries—including such improbable cases as France and Spain—half to two-thirds of the income of the top 1 percent consists of salaries (compensation for work). Rarely, in any present-day advanced economy, do returns on capital constitute more than a quarter of the incomes of the top 1 percent (in the US, it is less than 15 percent), Thomas Piketty's arguments notwithstanding.35 As one observer notes, “The fact that so many of [today's] top earners work for a living is striking,”36 given that a century ago the great majority of elite incomes came from investments in property, bonds, or equities. For another, the model accurately predicts the kind of “fractal” inequality that so far has seemed to prevail almost everywhere in advanced and semi-advanced economies.37 That is, inequality seems to have grown not only between, but within firms and occupations: the top lawyers, academics, physicians, middle managers, and even shop floor workers, have begun to earn far more than the median member of their profession, or even the median co-worker of equal qualifications in their firm.

Once we grant that such differences in talent can become important, the model suggests that any globalization-induced rise in the relative price of capital-intensive goods (or, equivalently, decline in the relative price of labor-intensive products) in advanced economies will depress (or threaten to depress) the wages not only of low-skill workers but also of high-skill ones of less than superlative talent. It thus raises the prospect that the growing resistance to global markets may be embraced, sooner rather than later, not only by low-skill workers but by a growing segment of those with higher education or advanced training.

New New Trade Theory

“New new” trade theory (NNTT) offers an alternative firm-centric view of top-heavy inequality.38 Whereas neo-H-O-S-S focuses on how workers of different talents select into different sectors, NNTT focuses on how firms of different productivity levels sort into import-export activities. One of its salient implications is that increases in foreign trade concentrate the distribution of profits into the largest and most productive firms in each sector.39

The intuition is simple: import and export activities require large upfront costs, such as setting up global logistics networks and investing overseas—costs that only the largest firms can afford. The benefits of trade, access to larger markets, for example, then make these large firms even larger, which subsequently allows them to out-compete their smaller domestic rivals. Armed with global economies of scale, superstars like Walmart and Amazon flood the domestic market with low-cost goods and services. This squeezes out the smallest firms, for example, local mom-and-pop establishments, while reducing the profits of the midsize firms, whose middling productivity permits them to sell only domestically. In sum, NNTT implies, and offers evidence to show, that superstar firms in each sector reap the lion's share of the gains from globalization.

In its earliest formulation, NNTT implied no wage inequality, because it assumed workers to be homogeneous. Recent advances draw implications for wage inequality by allowing some profits to pass through to workers—what the literature calls rent-sharing. One modification allows firms to screen, and bargain over quasi-rents with, workers of varying abilities.40 More productive exporting firms pay higher wages to attract higher-ability talent. In the end, rent-sharing allows inequality in firm profits to spill over into inequality in workers’ wages.41

NNTT implies that globalization-induced inequality should manifest itself principally at the level of the firm, pulling up the compensation of all workers in the larger and more successful firms, and leaving behind all of those employed in smaller, domestically oriented firms (or those unemployed through the demise of the smallest firms). This is exactly what Helpman and colleagues find in Brazil, where 70 percent of overall inequality occurs within sectors and occupational categories; similar results were obtained by Akerman and co-authors in an analysis of wage inequality in Sweden from 2000 to 2007.42

Economic Geography

Economic geography explores the origins and effects of one of society's most readily observable features: the unequal distribution of economic activity across space, a phenomenon commonly called agglomeration.43 Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth (in this issue) document how globalization's effects appear most clearly at the level of communities, and operate through the mechanisms specified by economic geography.44 Here we complement their account by situating economic geography within only the broader set of trade models that contribute to extreme inequality. Globalization, we contend, exacerbates regional inequality by inflicting economic stagnation and decline on all but a handful of superstar cities. The mechanism works through the joint effect of agglomeration forces and trade costs. Globalization facilitates the lowering of trade costs (not just those of transportation and communication, but also costs imposed by tariff policies), and this frees up firms to locate in the places that confer the greatest advantage.

The literature identifies many advantages to urban agglomerations. Large cities increase access to suppliers of intermediate inputs, as well as to transportation infrastructure, large pools of specialized talent, and diverse consumers. Moreover, they facilitate the exchange of information about changes in competition, technology, and consumer tastes.45 Some locations also offer a fixed advantage such as access to deep ports or natural resources. Overall, large cities exist and continue to grow because they confer some large basket of benefits on those who locate there.46 The link to globalization seems obvious: the cheaper transportation becomes, and the farther tariff barriers fall, the easier it is for firms and workers to realize the benefits of agglomeration.

For regional inequality to speak to the puzzle of earnings inequality, it must be true that changes in regional growth both reflect and pass through to the wages of resident workers. We find this plausible and consistent with evidence of the stark spatial inequality in returns on skills. A growing literature documents the “end of spatial wage convergence” since 1980, with the bulk of wage gains going to high-skill workers concentrating in just a handful of large cities.47 However, enormous wage inequality within the largest cities suggests that between-region inequality provides only a partial picture. In reality, heterogeneity among workers and firms likely overlaps with, and is accentuated by, the effects of large cities.

Notable Similarities and Differences

All three advances in trade theory point to the same pessimistic outcome, that globalization produces extreme inequality, where a narrow segment of society benefits to the exclusion of the rest. Each theory identifies a different set of “superstars” within this narrow segment: workers with superlative talents, extraordinarily productive firms, or urban agglomerations. Despite varying mechanisms, each arrives at the conclusion of extreme inequality by introducing some form of unit heterogeneity—an assumption that the actors we once treated as identical actually differ from one another in important ways. Workers of similar education differ in innate talent; firms in the same sector vary in productivity; and regions in the same country vary in their advantages of agglomeration. This heterogeneity suggests a radically different perspective on the politics of globalization, one where we should not be surprised that populist protectionist movements arise; that they vilify elites; or that, despite finding their base constituency among low-skill workers, they enjoy nontrivial support from high-skill workers across many sectors.

We highlight two differences among these theories. First, they arrive at the implication of extreme inequality by varying degrees of theoretical complexity. In this regard, neo-H-O-S-S offers a clear advantage: its general framework requires no added assumptions about heterogeneous firms, economies of scale, locational mobility, or rent sharing.

Second, and at least as important, is the empirical accuracy of key theoretical assumptions. In the case of NNTT, evidence for the crucial rent-sharing assumption is decidedly mixed.48 For economic geography, countries almost certainly differ in the degree to which factors are spatially mobile. The neo-H-O-S-S model of differently talented workers will enjoy the most traction in longer-run analyses of wage outcomes, where factors are fully mobile across sectors and regions. Overall, the evident variance in empirical support for different modeling assumptions should caution users to validate these assumptions in their particular research contexts.

Finally, these unit heterogeneity models are not mutually exclusive—they likely reinforce one another in interesting ways. The most talented workers can earn the highest wage by working for the largest firms that can afford them. Regional agglomeration facilitates this advantageous match by locating these superstar workers and superstar firms in the same city. Thus, the top-heavy inequality we observe may very well arise at the intersection of heterogeneous workers, firms, and regions.

Hypothesis

Under any of the three trade theories described here, globalization produces top-heavy inequality, wherein a thin margin of workers benefits while the rest are left behind. This drives a populist strain of backlash that views globalization as a struggle of the masses versus the elites. To our mind, this casts a different light on recent research that sees the backlash as a response to shocks from immigration or imports. To state our key hypothesis:

H when top-heavy inequality is high, shocks from trade, whether in goods, services, or factors of production, increase public support for populist parties. 49 In the absence of top-heavy inequality, however, such shocks have no effect on support for populism. 50

This assumes that inequality reflects the long-run wage effects of trade and migration. That is, if our trade theories accurately predict wage outcomes, then we should observe extreme, or top-heavy, inequality. As previously discussed, even though much of the inequality we observe does reflect trade patterns, inequality also derives from other sources, such as technological change.51

Inequality and Antiglobalization: Evidence from European Elections

We offer a very preliminary test of this hypothesis in the context of two recent studies of populist far-right vote shares in Europe. Their wide empirical coverage, spanning between them twenty-eight countries over twenty-six years (1988 to 2014), affords a high degree of external validity, at least among economically developed nations in recent decades. Also, the two studies focus on different aspects of globalization-related shocks, one on immigration and the other on imports. Finally, both papers offer rigorous research designs. In further examining and extending their findings, we introduce as few modifications as possible to the original designs.

Immigration and Inequality

The study by Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias (hereafter GRR) requires the least modification.52 It explores the role of immigration shocks and inequality in all national and European Parliament elections in the twenty-eight member states of the European Union between 2000 and 2014. In particular, the authors study, at the level of Eurostat's NUTS-2 regions,53 the vote shares obtained by “populist radical right” parties,54 which rose dramatically in the wake of the 2008–09 financial crisis (from 0.05 to 0.15 mean vote share across all countries).

In their original analysis, GRR find a positive association between right-populist vote share and both inequality and immigration, controlling for unemployment, immigration, and economic growth.55 Figure 2 replicates this result under the model labeled GRR2018.56

IO2020 extends that model simply by interacting their measures of inequality and immigration. We report the coefficients in standardized units for visual comparability and ease of interpretation. These models are also posted in Table A2 in the online appendix. Two findings follow from our analysis. First, GRR's original finding remains intact: an increase of one standard deviation in national-level inequality, all else equal, is associated with a 2.8-percentage-point increase in populist vote shares (p < .01). Since this exercise holds immigration constant, it suggests that inequality independently undermines support for the LIO. This likely reflects, as we discuss later in the paper, inequality's well-known effects on economic growth, polarization, and external conflict.

Second, our interaction model produces strong evidence for our key hypothesis, that surges in populist support from immigration shocks (which GRR found to have a modest and imprecisely estimated effect) are important but highly conditional on the level of inequality: magnifying backlash at extreme levels and nullifying backlash at lower levels. We visualize this result in a marginal effects plot in Figure 3. The differences in magnitudes are impressive. A one-standard-deviation (0.3 percentage point) increase in the share of migrants in the local population is associated with precisely zero change in vote shares for populist parties at even moderate levels of inequality (Gini < 0.29). At high levels of inequality (Gini > 0.34), the same one-standard-deviation increase in the share of migrants relates to a twenty-point increase in vote share for populist parties. These magnitudes are striking, given that the average NUTS-2 vote share for these parties is 6 percent, with a maximum of 54 percent. Rising immigration, it seems, poses a populist threat to the LIO only when paired with an income distribution that is, or has become, highly unequal.

Imports and Inequality

That inequality mediates shocks from immigration raises the obvious parallel question: does it similarly mediate import-related shocks? To this end, we repeat the earlier analysis, this time employing the data set from Colantone and Stanig (hereafter CS), who examine “China trade shocks” in the European context: fifteen Western European countries over the years 1988 to 2007.57 They report strong effects of Chinese imports on vote shares for radical Right parties58 at the level of the electoral district.59 We replicate their principal results, including their two-stage least squares estimators,60 in specifications 1 and 2 of Table A3 (in the online appendix).

The CS data set does not include a measure of income inequality. To test our interactive hypothesis, we employ inequality measures from the World Inequality Database.61 We report top 1 percent shares of post-tax income at the country level.62 We also apply logarithmic transformations to address issues of fit resulting from extreme outliers.63 Finally, we adopt a multilevel estimator that serves our particular data needs.64 The results rely on this preferred hierarchical estimator.65 Table A3 (in the online appendix) documents how these modifications affect the original CS findings.66

The results for import shocks closely mirror those for immigration. Figure 4 plots the coefficients of our preferred model (IO2020) alongside a baseline model in CS (CS2018). As expected, the positive association between Chinese imports and populist vote shares is highly conditioned by inequality. The coefficient on the China shock remains significant only when interacted with top-1-percent income shares. The marginal effects plot in Figure 5 translates this into real-world terms. At low to medium top-heavy inequality (top 1 percent shares < 0.09), a one-standard-deviation increase in imports (approximately 170 EUR per NUTS-2 worker) relates to no statistically significant change in district vote shares for populist parties—that is, no populist backlash from rising imports. However, in countries where the top 1 percent earns approximately 10 percent or more of national income, the same magnitude of imports is associated with a 25-to-50-percent increase in district vote shares, on average, for right-populist parties.

In combination with the results from immigration shocks, this analysis provides strong support for our hypothesis that the politics of LIO backlash are best understood from the perspective of the three recent advances in trade theory that predict top-heavy inequality. Trade in goods, or in factors of production, in the context of heterogeneous firms, workers, and regions, produces top-heavy inequality that, we argue, sets the stage for a particularly populist form of backlash. We provide suggestive evidence from European elections that is largely consistent with this; migration and imports drive support for populist parties only where we observe high inequality.

Possible Remedies and Sources of Resilience

An optimistic reading of this analysis is that national redistribution provides an effective remedy against right-populist backlashes. This finding is consistent with the “compensation hypothesis,” that government redistribution to globalization's losers increases public support for trade.67 Our paper contributes to this literature by suggesting that redistribution targeted at top-heavy inequality (superstar earners, regions, and firms) to the benefit of otherwise skilled workers in smaller firms and cities would be especially effective.

Wyoming’s card ends

However, democracies famously fail to address rising inequality with redistribution.Footnote68 This leads us to a more pessimistic conclusion that, even though lower inequality increases support for globalization, there is little evidence that governments will redistribute in countries with already high top-heavy inequality. We therefore agree with Atkinson that more redistribution of the large gains from globalization would be both possible and effective; but mass support for it, paradoxically, is weak.Footnote69 There is hope for other policy suggestions, as well. Investment in education, even if it could achieve the requisite political support, would fail to address the central problem: outsized gains from “superstar” talent, cities, and firms. Global forms of redistribution, such as the world “Tobin tax” on cross-border financial transactions, promise to tax capital without encouraging capital flight. However, such visions have been dismissed as “utopian.”Footnote70 They would also raise the substantial issues of global governance that Rodrik's “globalization trilemma” has highlighted: who would enact such a tax, and to whom would the revenues flow?Footnote71

Instead, governments are far more likely to enact protection—restrictions on imports and immigration that reduce welfare but undeniably also reduce inequality. Williamson shows that the choking-off of US immigration from the 1920s to the 1960s contributed significantly to the “great leveling” of American inequality, including the Great Migration of African Americans out of the US South, as Northern employers began to substitute Black for immigrant labor.Footnote72 Restricting low-wage imports would of course have a similar effect. These options offer the losers from globalization only a larger slice of a (likely much) smaller pie.

If governments under pressure from top-heavy inequality continue to substitute protectionism for redistribution, can the LIO that stands for globalization nonetheless be sustained? We see two possible sources of resilience. First, powerful interests in the LIO can be expected to defend it.Footnote73 Second, international institutions still matter. The retreat of the US, as a principal guarantor of the LIO, poses an undeniable threat to its institutions and to the peace and cooperation they foster. However, IR research cautions against premature reports of its demise. Despite declining US support, international institutions will continue to serve vital functions for their members—functions that make these institutions “sticky” in the face of shocks.Footnote74 More recent scholarship in this vein suggests that the international institutions that were hardest to create, and whose rules are flexible, are the most likely to weather the shock of declining US support.Footnote75 To the extent that other institutions were created with less effort and exhibit less flexibility, however, other powerful states will seek to install alternatives that better serve them.

## Block

### Cp

#### Euphemism Link – describing terrocrats as “governments” provides “shelter for despots” and demobilizes agency by spectacularizing an all-powerful ill-defined extra-human foe instead of slavemasters that blacks have experience negotiating around and defying for centuries

Mann 97 (Frederick, author and founder of Free World Order. NSPIC Debate. <http://www.mind-trek.com/reports/tl07e.htm>)

You might think, "So what? Why is this important?" Much of the time, it isn't. When the referent is a thing, a physical object, the distinction isn't important. But what happens when we use a word like "government?" What is the referent? The word "government" is generally used as a singular noun describing a creature that sounds like a human only much more powerful. Here are some examples from earlier articles: "Certainly the government is concerned only for itself and it's kin (politicians). Certainly the government will kill or imprison me if this is perceived to be in its interest. Certainly the government has the power to do so." ... "It may be very difficult for individual humans to be aware of the thought processes of governments..." and "Communicating with a government is not easy at all." You can easily find other examples in the newspaper or just listening to people talk, of the word "government" being used as if it refers to a single volitional entity. Who or what then, is this beast called "government?" Have you seen it? Have you spoken with it? Do you know any one who has? Even though the word "government" is often used as if the referent is a single being, it's obvious that it isn't. So what then does the word "government" refer to? Maybe nothing. No thing. Maybe there is no such THING as "government." At first, this may seem like a trivial distinction. After all, there are still policemen, judges, congressmen, IRS agents and other assorted terrocrats. Yes, there are people who call themselves "government." Some of them are very dangerous and all of them want to interfere with the lives of others. But thinking of "government" as an ill-defined, all-powerful foe, puts you in the position of a victim. How can anyone stand up to such a "government" as that? I certainly couldn't. This is a scary creature. But if I cross paths with a terrocrat or two, I can handle that. Terrocrats are human, with no magical powers. I can arrange my life to avoid or minimize contact with them. I can't defend myself against a mythical "government" beast. Terrocrats are human. I can deal with them.

### Kritik

#### The alternative alone solves the aff better- black foodways have always been a way to access self-determination in the face racial capitalist power structures.

**McClintock 18** [Nathan McClintock, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, May 22, 2018, “Urban agriculture, racial capitalism, and resistance in the settler-colonial city”, Wiley Online Library, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gec3.12373?casa_token=v-oWijW4HMgAAAAA%3AuCrVmoalxNdvNZ7QhGTAKebNuh5nBESgnZ91qHVKn6zoOZeBi-sbGJRS6ZUgu4xhlQs6AK_yJRcbACUU>, JMH]

Through these lenses, understanding UA as a form of resistance and self-determination under racial capitalism/settler colonialism first demands attention to “banal acts of daily subsistence” as these “reflect and reproduce capitalist social relations, express their contradictions, and contain the seeds of their overcoming” (Figueroa, 2015, p. 502). **Urban food production has historically served as a means of subsistence for low-income, racialized, and marginalized populations, supplementing diets and providing agriculturalists with supplemental income from sales of garden surplus.** Often arriving in cities and towns from rural areas, people with limited incomes grew food to lower grocery costs and earn a little money on the side (McClintock, 2010; Nicolaides, 2001); indeed, in many cities, agriculture and truck farming was often one of the few activities open to racialized immigrants (Gibb & Wittman, 2013; Lim, 2015; Wong, 2004, pp. 211–220). For African Americans who moved from the U.S. South to urban centers in the North and West during the two Great Migrations, growing staple vegetables such as okra, collards, and sweet potatoes and raising small livestock was a means of saving money, supplementing incomes, and having fresh produce in the summer and canned surplus for the winter (Wiese, 2005, p. 78). Later waves of immigration to U.S. cities similarly saw newcomers growing food at home and in community gardens (Airriess & Clawson, 1994; Baker, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2014; Martinez, 2010; Saldivar-Tanaka & Krasny, 2004). For many immigrants, urban gardening provides “biographical continuity” (Li, Hodgetts, & Ho, 2010, p. 786) between their old lives in their country of origin and their lives in a new culture and space (Irazábal & Punja, 2009; Mares & Peña, 2010). Gardens also provided sustenance for many Indigenous people forcefully relocated to large cities in the 1950s and 1960s (Pollak, 2016, p. 94). Food production has thus served as a buffer against economic upheaval inherent to the socio-spatial logic of uneven capitalist development (McClintock, 2010; Sbicca, 2014; Tornaghi, 2014), providing a modicum of food security, supplementing diets with fresh produce, and providing benefits to mental and physical health (Gray, Guzman, Glowa, & Drevno, 2014; Hale et al., 2011; Kortright & Wakefield, 2011). **Urban food production has similarly contributed to Black self-determination.** Indeed, foodways have long played an important role in emancipatory politics in African American communities—from the agricultural and culinary knowledge of enslaved people (Carney, 2009; Wisecup, 2015) to the anti-hunger work of the Black Panther Party (Heynen, 2009b)—and have been a site of negotiation between divergent Black political ideologies (McCutcheon, 2015), from which theories of praxis emerge that link analysis of racial capitalist structures and relations to the “deeply human side” of everyday survival (Heynen, 2009a, p. 197). Black gardening is thus “a way to stake a claim to permanency, education, economic citizenship, and community leadership, rather than only as a vehicle for food security” (Tuck, Smith, Guess, Benjamin, & Jones, 2014, p. 55). Examining urban gardens in a majority African American area of Washington, DC, Reese (2018, p. 421) explains how gardeners draw on “memories and myths” of a hyper-local Black economy that arose in response to redlining and segregation. These affective stories served as “both a critique of the breakdown of Black community life and as inspiration for reclaiming a past of cooperative living that was seemingly lost.” Indeed, gifting, sharing, and trading garden produce between Black gardeners has traditionally “reinforced community bonds and preserved tangible links” (Wiese, 2005, p. 85) not only to an African American agrarian heritage in the South but also to Black liberation struggles and the Blues development tradition, more broadly (Figueroa, 2015; Heynen, 2009b; McCutcheon, 2013; Ramírez, 2015; Rickford, 2017; White, 2011b). Echoing other studies of UA in Detroit (Pothukuchi, 2015; White, 2011b, 2011a), Safransky (2017, p. 1093) describes how for some Black farmers, UA is “a strategy of resistance, an act of self-determination, a challenge to systemic violence” that contributes to wider efforts “to undo colonial spatial orders and structures of white supremacy,” an observation that appears to be true of Black UA efforts across the country: New York (Reynolds & Cohen, 2016; Sbicca & Myers, 2017); Chicago (Block, Chávez, Allen, & Ramirez, 2012; Shabazz, 2015, pp. 115–118); Los Angeles (Bonacich & Alimahomed-Wilson, 2011; Broad, 2016); the Bay Area (Bradley & Galt, 2014; Sbicca, 2016); and many other American cities (Passidomo, 2016; Ramírez, 2015; Rodriguez, 2017). As the literature cited in this article illustrates, UA can serve as both a tool of racial Othering and dispossession and a tool of resistance to these same processes and their outcomes. Urban agriculture is not inherently one way or another—it is simply an everyday practice. How it is mobilized and by whom, however, can make all the difference in whether it serves to bolster racial capitalism or to undermine it. Viewing UA through a relational framework of racial capitalism and settler colonialism can help clarify some of its contradictory outcomes. Future theoretical and empirical work in this vein might address any number of scales, from ethnographies focused on the micro-geographies of everyday UA practices, to macro-scale relational comparative work. A few additional recommendations for future work are worth mentioning. First, regardless of the scale or scope of analysis, scholars should work hard to identify which specific processes are at play in a given case, to clarify precisely how racial Othering and settler logics of erasure and dispossession mediate particular political economic processes (see, for example, Coulthard, 2014; Day, 2016; King, 2016; Pasternak & Dafnos, 2017). Second, future work should place gender more centrally, given the gendered dynamics of UA and social reproduction, more broadly. Third, while some have called for more attention to UA practiced by people of color (to offset the disproportionate attention paid to the urban farming of young, White hipsters; see Reynolds & Cohen, 2016, for example), scholars should take care to avoid essentializing the UA practices of Indigenous people and people of color. Fostering and protecting spaces for people to tell their own stories is one important way to uphold the diversity of epistemologies and narratives. Finally, future work might even call into question using UA as a framework of analysis in and of itself. Given that hunting, fishing, and gathering of foods are all central to Indigenous food sovereignty and resurgence (Daigle, 2017; Poe, LeCompte, McLain, & Hurley, 2014; Simpson & Bagelman, 2018), we might ask whether a narrow, Eurocentric focus on cultivation, as opposed to a more broadly defined food system, works to erase non-White epistemologies and practices. In sum, given the extent to which discursive Othering and erasure undergird racial capitalism, how we frame UA and other food spaces—and, indeed, what we choose to focus our research on—clearly matters.

#### Blackness is structurally positioned in society as an absolute non-Other in relation to humanity at the levels of phenomenology, mythology, psychology, and spirituality. Contingency is non-responsive because the aff doesn’t operate on the level at which contingent antiblackness becomes ontological.

More, 21—professor of philosophy at the University of Limpopo (Mabogo, “The Body, Racism, and Contingency,” *Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment*, Chapter 5, 122-130, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Why then is the black person in an antiblack world the absolute Other or a non-Other? Phenomenological ontology reveals that Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir asks several critical questions about the being of woman, which led her to study the notion of Otherness and subordination. These critical questions may, mütãt´ĭs mütãn´dĭs, apply to blacks in an antiblack world except that for blacks, Otherness takes on a different form of “not-other.” Echoing Hegel and Sartre, she states: “We find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed—he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object” (de Beauvoir, 1989: xxiii). She first notes that a man would never write a book on the situation of the human male. Thus, the relation between man and woman is not symmetrical. Male represents both the positive and the neutral aspects of humanity while female stands only for the negative aspects. The male describes himself in his theories as standing for the normal and the ideal while the female is depicted as the deviant. This means that man defines woman as relative to him, in oppositional terms. Thus, her well-known declaration: “He is the Subject, he is the Absolute— she is the Other” (de Beauvoir, 1989: xxii).

The key to the solution lies in Sartre’s ontology of “being-for-Others” or what is commonly called “the problem of other minds.” His model of our relations with other human beings is grounded not on Heidegger’s Mitsein but on Hegel’s master/slave relations. Otherness, for him, arises from the attempt of consciousness to understand itself. In its upsurge, consciousness, by a stroke of internal and external negation, has to be other than another being. Through the negation of not being the Other, I make myself be and the Other arises as the Other. This negation in my relations with the Other constitutes a relation of conflict. Accordingly, my sense of self is constituted not only by my assumptions about who I am, but also by a sense of who or what I am not. In Hegelian fashion, Sartre emphasizes that self-consciousness is possible through the existence of another self-consciousness which reflects it. There can be no self-consciousness or self-knowledge without the presence of an Other who appears as my mirror. This however implies the reverse idea about Otherness, namely: that the image we construct of the Other also emerges out of a particular sense of who we are and who or what we are not. At the origin of every self-image, argues Charmé, “lies an idea of the Other, an ‘Other-image’ that delineates what one’s own self is not” (1991: 5). The models of the self and the Other which we thus create are called “mythic” by Charmé in order to “indicate that the essential qualities by which we define self and other, as well as the boundaries we trace between them, consist of a delicate web of our most primordial assumptions about what is real and of value” (1991: 5). These mythic images include the distorted and hidden images we sometimes create of Others. In this distortion we experience what is Other as either potentially good or evil. In short, we construct a Manichean myth. For the anti-Semite, the embodiment of the Other is the Jew; for the colonizer, it is the native; for the bourgeoisie, it is the proletariat; and of course, for the antiblack consciousness, it is the Negro or black person.

But, as pointed out earlier, it is worth keeping in mind that in an antiblack world, black Otherness—unlike other Othernesses—takes on a different mode of relationality. This constitutes antiblack racism as unique and different from other forms of racisms and oppressions. While the relation between the oppressor and the oppressed, bourgeoisie and proletariat, anti-Semite and Jew, male and female is that of self-Other, that is, shared category of humanness, the relation between white and black is a relation of non-relationality since the non-humanity of the black is the operative category. In such a condition the self-Other relation is eradicated and what remains is the self-not-Other relation. This non-relational relation is given credence through the construction of myths by the antiblack as a flight from the reality of its contingency.

The antiblack consciousness constructs such “myths” in relation to itself and the racial not-Other in an effort to transcend the reality of its contingency. The very creation of myths constitutes itself as contradiction, that is, the very necessity to create myths is itself a recognition and admission of the humanity of the group for whom myths have to be created. The power and importance of myths of whatever kind—racial or otherwise—was recognized by a former rector of the former Rand Afrikaans University (now University of Johannesburg) in South Africa, who later rose in the apartheid regime to become Minister of National Education and finally the vice president of the country, Gerrit Viljoen. He said the following about the racial solidarity of the Afrikaner people in a speech delivered in 1971:

The Volk has the need for myths to help support its ethnic existence. Even in those cases where their content is incongruent with the objective external historical or contemporary reality, they may yet mirror certain internal values and ideals that bind the community together through their acceptance of and faith in it. The point isn’t whether myth is objective, true or fictitious, but whether the community accepts it as a veritable rendering of what they regard as a truthful and authentic value or ideal. (cited in Schutte, 1995: 31)

This is a classic example of bad faith, that is, the attempt to flee a displeasing truth for a pleasing falsehood. By his own admission, Viljoen acknowledges that falsification is necessary in order to achieve the objective of the myth.2 In antiblack mythic imagination, the racist consciousness conceives human beings racially (through the color of the body) different from itself as the absolute non-Other, as antithetical to itself in the order of humanity, in the Great Chain of Being.

As indicated in the early chapters, Sartre conceives of racism in contrast conception of the Other. For him, blacks, women, homosexuals, Jews, and other marginal groups, “represent paradigmatic Others in his culture, i.e. inverted images of the normative archetypes of white, male, heterosexual, Christian culture” (Charmé, 1991a: 253). In his work on anti-Semitism, he characterizes the Jew as a contrast conception whom the anti-Semite needs. The presence of the Jew is an imperative necessity for the anti-Semite. “To whom else could he be superior? Better still, it is in opposition to the Jew, and the Jew alone, that he realizes the legality of his own existence” (Sartre, 1948: 22–23). It is in opposition to the Jew, and the Jew alone, that the antiSemite realizes the justifiability of his own existence. The existence of the Jew or the black allows the racist to persuade himself at birth that his place in the world was pre-given or pre-ordained and therefore that he has a divine or traditional right to occupy it. Such a consciousness does not only persuade itself to believe that its existence is justified and necessary and therefore that it has a right to live but also questions the right of others to exist. However, Sartre’s conception of racism as “Other—Thought” is, as we have shown earlier, not adequate as a convincing account of antiblack racism according to which a black person is not an Other but a non-Other.

It is generally recognized that the main differentiating racial characteristics of the black are phenotypical, for example, skin color, texture of the hair, facial bone structure, shape of the nose and lips, in short, the body. Other alleged characteristics such as intellectual inferiority are predicated upon the contingent fact of black bodily being. The antiblack seized upon this contingent fact and transformed it into a myth that serves as justification for racism. In Barthes’s opinion, myth has “the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification and making contingency appear eternal” (1972: 142). The myth takes the form of three arguments, namely (1) the Naturalistic Argument, (2) the Psychological Argument, and (3) the Religious Argument.

NATURALISTIC ARGUMENT

Consider all things in nature that are good, pleasant, beautiful, and desirable. These are always symbolically associated with whiteness, light, or brightness. On the contrary, whatever is evil, repulsive, ugly, and undesirable is always symbolically associated with blackness and darkness. In nature, there are permanent pairs of binary oppositions: day and night, growth and decay, life and death, cleansing and dirtying, and so on. Vegetation flourishes in the sunlight of day. In the absence of sunlight, and consequently the presence of darkness, vegetation would die. In blackness or darkness there cannot be life. Blackness is fundamentally opposed to life while whiteness or light promotes life. Similarly, night and its accompanying darkness bring about all that is dreaded; horrible things happen in the darkness of night. Cleanliness brings about health and life, while dirt is the repository of sickness and death (Austin, 1979). Each pair of the binaries from nature, therefore, has the dual characteristic of being good or evil. That which is evil is associated with blackness and the good with whiteness. A Manichean world emerges from which the cosmos is conceived in terms of a struggle between Good and Evil.

To repeat what I pointed out earlier, there are no white people in the sense of the whiteness of snow. The “whiteness” of people is a constructed or imagined whiteness. At the most, phenomenologically speaking, there are light and dark human beings, not white and black. People with “white” skin color became evaluated or evaluated themselves positively in line with the positive or good characteristics associated with whiteness, light, brightness in nature. “Black” skinned people, on the other hand, became negatively evaluated and associated with all the bad or evil things of darkness. In other words, for a racist consciousness, that which is good is white and that which is bad is black. After all, God and Jesus are assumed to be white while the devil is portrayed as black. No one, even black people, can imagine God as not white. As a result, Gordon argues that “from the standpoint of the white in an antiblack world, God is the hoped for ‘we’ upon whom the white assumption of being God can be deferred. Since whiteness is the ideal, the white man is either God or as close to God as anyone can be on earth” (1995: 149). Gordon then concludes, “Hence only the white can reflect upon himself as being pre-reflectively linked to God in his essential feature of value: his whiteness” (1995: 150).

To substantiate this myth, the racist develops an a posteriori proof of the specific incarnation of evil. Like Penny Sparrow, the antiblack claims that one need only look at these blacks and one will immediately perceive the “nature of their vile being.” In dictionaries and encyclopedias, the word “Negro” is defined in negative terms. All the characteristics attributed to the Negro in such definitions are those that are assumed to be antithetical to or in opposition to those attributed to Europeans (whites). If Negroes are ugly, whites are beautiful. Binaries are constructed: flat-nose–pointed nose, thick lips–thin lips, idleness–industriousness, cruelty–merciful, lying–truthful, revengeful–forgiveness, and so on. Thus, antiblack racism, in its origin, is Manichean; it explains the way of the world through the struggle between the forces of Good and Evil.

This myth, Sartre argues, is inscribed in the very languages of Europe in which “white” and “black” are connected on a hierarchical system. “The Negro will learn to say ‘white like snow’ to indicate innocence, to speak of the blackness of a look, of a soul, of a deed. As soon as he opens his mouth, he accuses himself . . . can you imagine the strange savor that an expression like ‘the blackness of innocence’ or ‘the darkness of virtue’ would have for us?” (Sartre, 1988: 304).

Nature, from the point of view of this argument, has condemned inferior races and consecrated the superior race. Accordingly, antiblack racism is natural because it “is in Nature since it is a natural fact that the black is inferior to the white. It is by divine right since Nature in a created world is ordered according to the will of God” (Sartre, 1992: 269–270). But what parcels out the superior from the inferior race is their genetic or physical structure. Connect this to the conception of the pairs attributed to nature above, the superior race would be the one associated with whiteness and the inferior associated with blackness. The antiblack, therefore, produces the black in order to found and justify himself or herself [their self] by giving himself a sens and raison d’être. For, blackness in and by itself has no value or meaning except the value and meaning we confer on it.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Every group requires the Other for self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-essentiality. Hence, because of certain biological contingencies rather than historical events, antiblack consciousness has succeeded in turning the black subject into an Absolute Other, that is, into non-Otherness. To maintain this unique alterity (non-Otherness), it was necessary, therefore, to construct all kinds of myths about blacks. Fanon, using Carl Jung’s “collective unconscious” as a theoretical point of departure, argues that Europeans construct myths, collective attitudes, and prejudices (what Jung calls the “collective unconscious”) about the black person. In these myths, blacks are the uncivilized primitive savages and often animals. This European collective unconscious is responsible for the myth and symbolism of evil associated with black personhood. In Europe, Fanon says, the black man is the symbol of Evil. To an antiblack consciousness, black people symbolize everything negative. Put differently, for Fanon, “In the collective unconscious of homo occidentalis, the Negro—or if one prefers, the color black—symbolizes evil, sin, wretchedness, death, war, famine” (1967: 190–191).

Another form of psychological argument, which is a product of projection, and even repression, is the whites’ ascription to black of animalistic behavior, the most important of which is the presumed inexhaustible black libido. Projection is the endowment of attributes which the subject him/ herself possesses and which are perhaps socially unacceptable to another person. Another way of putting it, projection is a form of dealing with anxiety, whether moral, neurotic, or reality anxiety by attributing the source of this anxiety to another individual. An example of projection might come in this form; instead of “I hate him,” a person projects his hatred to another person and say: “He hates me.” In the case of white people’s attribution of sexual libido to blacks, Ephraim writes:

The attribution of an inexhaustible libido to black people has made them more susceptible than any other people to social transgressions, not necessarily because of any wrongdoing on their part, but primarily because of the European’s terror of the sexual instinct before which he feels [they feel] powerless, irredeemably impotent. It is this terror that he projects onto the world and onto black people in particular (2003: 327)

Chabani Manganyi, a clinical psychologist, who I shall later discuss, writing about the “the body-for-others” has the following to say about projection as a means of scapegoating or bad faith:

The negative values associated with blackness (blackness as dirt, impurity, smell) become vehicles in race supremacist cultures for the racist’s attempts to adapt to his [their] estrangement from the reality of his [their] body. The projection of these undesirable attributes of the human body to the victim of racism as a convenient scapegoat, is part and parcel of the process of denial and self-deception which characterises the culture heroics of Western culture and civilisation. (1981: 113)

As indicated above by Judge Mabel Jansen’s and Louise Mibille’s ascription of rape to black men, one of the myths by antiblack racists is inextricably connected with sex. Always lurking behind antiblack racist practices is the fantasized fears and desires about the sexuality of black people. This is what is sometimes referred to as the psychosexual explanation of antiblack racism, a psychological creation of the sexual Frankenstein’s monster in blacks who comes back to haunt the creator. Throughout the history of the encounter between African people (blacks) and Europeans, sex has been a hidden dominant feature that determined relations between the two groups. Because of this, the black man has become a phobogenic object to non-black peoples, a stimulus of anxiety and extreme fear. In their fantasy claims, Europeans have spread the myth that black people are aggressively libidinous, people possessed by an indomitable, indefatigable sex drive, and oversexed creatures. By the eighteenth century, the sexuality of the black, both male and female, had become an icon for deviant sexuality. If their sexuality and their sexual parts could be shown to be inherently different, this would be a sufficient indication or demonstration that the blacks were a separate and lower species from whites and as different from the European as the proverbial Orangutan. The difference was mainly confined to the sexual parts of black people: the black man’s assumed extra-large penis and the black woman’s (Hottentot Venus—Saartie Bartmann) extended buttocks and the “remarkable development of the labia minoria, or nymphae” (Flower and Murie, 1867). For the antiblack white person the black man is the object to which real or imagined fears of sexual impotency or inadequacy are transferred and fixed. In other words, the black man (African) is phobogenic, that is, he instills fear and anxiety. Thus, from this point of view, black men, on the one hand, are lascivious, potential rapists—each desiring to go to bed, especially with a white woman. Black women, on the other hand, are presumed to be wanton temptresses, wild seductresses of white men, or “amazons” (Cleaver, 1968).

RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT

In an antiblack world, the religious argument appeals to the scriptures to establish black non-Otherness.3 The Bible which most black people revere is heavily laden with negative images, symbolisms, and narratives of blackness. It identifies blackness with evil, disaster, famine, plagues, doom, ugliness, and with the invocation of the story of the curse of Ham to account for racial difference, antiblack racism in the Bible becomes evident. From this biblical narrative, blackness is the color of those who have been condemned to perpetual servitude of being “the hewers of wood and drawers of water.” Even the Ku Klux Klan, John L. Jackson argues, used the Bible and Christian religion to justify their racist beliefs. According to him, the Ku Klux Klan was more a religious cult than anything else. As he puts it: “It was the Klan’s commitment to the Bible, a literal reading with racial inflections, that provided moral weight for their holy crusade against racial amalgamation and blacks’ shortlived political gains during Reconstruction” (2008: 58). Another popular version of this religious argument is that of the “Chosen People.” This argument has had a number of adherents in the world, more so in countries founded on imperialist aggression. America has been described as “God’s own country.” Herman Melville is reported as saying: “We Americans are peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our times” (Degenaar in Sundermeier, 1975: 25). Cecil John Rhodes justified British imperialism in the following words:

Only one race . . . approach God’s ideal type, his own Anglo-Saxon race; God’s purpose then was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help on God’s work and fulfil His purpose in the world was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race and so bring nearer the reign of justice, liberty and peace. (Degenaar in Sundermeier, 1975: 25)

The myth of the chosen people has also been a dominant feature of the Afrikaner justification for Apartheid in South Africa. Time after time the neo-Fichteans (Dr Nico Diedrichs and P. J. Meyer) and the Kuyperian Calvinists (H. G. Stoker and L. J. Du Plessis) described themselves as God’s chosen people to oversee both South Africa and the blacks. Some of their pronouncements as cited by Degenaar include: “Afrikanerdom is not the work of man, but a creation of God. We have a divine right to be Afrikaners” (in Sundermeier, 1975: 25). Afrikaners considered themselves chosen by God and destined to control and rule blacks through the grace of God and his holy wisdom. Now recently in the “post”-apartheid South Africa, this religious justification of racism played itself out through a white owner of a Guest House (Sodwana Bay Guest House) in northern KwaZulu-Natal, who after refusing to accommodate black people as guests, claimed that, according to the Bible, blacks are not people and that apartheid is dictated by God. In an interview with Jacinta Ngobese, a black presenter of the radio show, The Brunch, Andre Slade, the owner of the Guest House, said to the presenter: “You are classified in the Bible as an animal, you are not homo-sapiens” (June 24, 2016). The religious concept of “the chosen people” has its origin from this desire for justification.4

A variant of this argument sometimes incorporates the naturalistic argument to justify black oppression. Since nature is the creation of God, and since blacks are by natural design, by God’s will, inferior to whites, then white superiority is a divine right. Sartre cites Thomas Dew’s assertion about natural and divine order of superiority and inferiority among races: “It is the natural and divine order that those endowed with superior faculties . . . make use of and control the inferior beings” (Sartre, 1984: 570). This religious justification of antiblack racism introduces a theodicean problematic which ultimately led William Jones to pose the question as a title of his book: Is God a White Racist? (1998).5 This is a legitimate question given the fact that the Bible itself gives credence to racial oppression through narratives such as the “Curse of Ham.”

#### Libidinal economy is true

Chico et al 11 (A Primer on "Libidinal Economy" in Relation to Black Folks. Cosmic Hoboes: An Afropessimist Meditation (No)Space. <https://cosmichoboes.blogspot.com/2011/08/primer-on-libidinal-economy-in-relation.html>)

People who are interested in struggle need to understand the "libidinal economy." Coalition politicos like Al Sharpton like to tell us to put the unique experiences of black folks in the backseat to the interests of poor folks more generally. Such politicians expect us to submerge our interests as black people on the assumption that if poor people in general benefit from a political concession, poor black people will share equally in such benefits. Such politicos will continue to ignore the repeated evidence that a lot of nonblack people hate black people, even if doing so costs them money. If someone tells you that the problems black folks face are really just the problems that poor people face, they are telling you to ignore the libidinal economy. They are telling you that the political economy of capitalism is more important than the libidinal economy of antiblack racism. What is "libidinal economy"? In Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010, Duke University Press), black political theorist Frank Wilderson highlights the distinction between political economy and libidinal economy (p. 9): Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. Importantly, it is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction, and the violence of lethal consumption. He emphasizes that it is “the whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” something more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Gramsci and other marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties, pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.” What does all this mean? Let's interpret this elaborate definition and get to how it thinks of "economy." When we think of economy, we usually think of something having to do with money. Wilderson uses the term political economy to refer to economy in the ways that we usually think of it: the ways people exchange materials and decide on how things are valued. Economy doesn't just mean the economy in the sense of the stock market or banks, but also any means of determining whether something is worth doing or possessing based on how much capital and labor power it yields. In struggle, we see over and over that money talks and bullshit walks. Economy has to do with what they value moves people to act. Economies are therefore very important to political action. But can there be an economy that exchanges something other than money or capital? Yes. To understand "economy" as Wilderson and Sexton use it, we have to think of economy in a more general way as things of all kinds that we can trade or save. You can accumulate not only cash or material items, but also fears and desires. Certain people accumulate more fear (the black athlete) and desire (the blonde cheerleader) than others. The term libidinal economy refers to the systems of exchange and valuation for fantasies, desires, fears, aversions, and enjoyment. Economy is about exchange and accumulation. Everyone feels fear and aggression, but where is it directed? The libidinal is about both people's desires, fantasies, and pleasures AND their phobias, fears, and violent consumptions. A libidinal economy has to do with which groups a subject is attracted to, which groups it is willing to form alliances with, and which people it is willing to provide affection to. Where can we see this libidinal economy? How can we illustrate this distinction? The libido is the collection of things like phobias and desires that are unconscious and invisible but that have a visible effect on the world, including the money economy. Some examples: We see libidinal economies at work any time there is a response by state that is out of all proportion to the material effects of any practice they are regulating. The USA incarcerates three million people, despite the fact that doing so has an adverse impact on US financial security. Hence the libidinal economy of the fear of black and brown people (who together comprise the overwhelming majority of inmates) trumps the political economy of the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining prisons. Let's take another example of the powder - versus crack-cocaine distinction, in which the same drug is punished differently at the federal level. Because the two drugs are chemically identical, there shouldn't be any distinction between how their use and sale is punished. In 2010, the law made it so that these two drugs were punished the same, although the Obama administration isn't in any hurry to make the abolition of this distinction retroactive so that the mostly black and brown people who are locked up because of it will get released. But the legal abolition of this distinction is not essential for us to look at. What is essential is why that distinction was made in the first place. Wilderson's work suggests that, for civil society, black people pose a threat that has nothing to do with the chemical content or the social and cultural effects of crack. Simply by being associated with black people, crack is seen as 100 times more threatening than is powder cocaine. The financial and social costs of locking all those black and brown people up and the financial and social costs of allowing all those white people to go free and continue to sell does not really matter to civil society. What the powder- versus crack-cocaine distinction shows is the desire to contain the threat that blackness symbolizes. This is the mark of libidinal economy. Cops, soldiers, firemen are considered sexually desirable because they become the heroes of civil society. The Oscar Grant shooting. Amadou Diallo was a victim of a extreme kind of violence because of the phobias that converged on his body. What is the exchange? Civil society has an anxiety about crime, and crime is always attached to black in urban areas. Police don't have to get a monetary award, but they get the gratitude of civil society. How does this play out in ways that don't have to do strictly with money? The desire for them may not show up in the amount of money they make. Cops get rewarded for their aggression. When the cop slammed dude into the glass at BART. Prison guards, thought of as having the toughest beat on the planet. They get rewarded for being the last line of defense against George Jackson. Oscar Grant was an accumulation of aggression and phobias. Why are the black people in Prince George's County, Maryland, segregated from white people in their same socioeconomic bracket with the same kinds of high-value real estate, and the same kinds of political-economic values? Living around white people has a value that cannot be explained in strictly monetary terms. AFDC benefited mostly white single mothers, and enjoyed a long history of support from 1936-the 1960s. It initially excluded black people. By the 1960s, when black people started getting it, attitudes changed toward it, making it seem like it was undeserved and a drain on national prosperity, and by 1984, when Ronald Reagan referred to "welfare queens in Cadillacs," it was clear that AFDC was "a black thing." In actual statistical terms, it was still used mostly by white women. But once it became associated with poor black women, it was seen as in need of drastic, radical reforms. But is this "libidinal economy" really that important? Frank Wilderson is using the distinction between a money economy and an economy of desire over and over again throughout this book. Wilderson talks about this by talking about the difference between word and deed. This is not the hypocrisy of the system. It IS the logic of the system. So Europeans tried to resolve the lack of labor power by passing laws that reduced homeless white people to the status of slaves. In the end, however, they never really enforced these laws. Wilderson quotes David Eltis, an economic historian, who says that the costs of settling the "new world" would have been significantly reduced if Europeans has simply enslaved other Europeans. But, Wilderson points out, "what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the [symbolic value] which structures the libidinal economy of civil society." In other words, the symbolic costs of Europeans enslaving other Europeans would have been too great. Instead, they went to Africa for their slaves, even though the financial cost of doing so was much, much greater. The radical left doesn't make this distinction. Cornel West and Tavis Smiley say they want to organize a new Poor People's Campaign, but they won't be able to explain why this is a failed project from the start. This is because they won't think about the aspects of coalition building that have nothing to do with money or the lack of money. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called "Reagan Democrats" were poor and working-class white people, many of them in unions, who voted overwhelmingly for Reagan against their own economic interest. The white left mistakenly thinks about the Reagan Democrats as people who were duped. They view them as an example of what Marx called "false consciousness" and they see it as their duty to inform the white poor and working class of why they should vote left. But there were all kinds of signs that white poor and working-class folks simply hated black people and didn't want to live anywhere that there was a large community of black people, even if those black people are of the same or higher socioeconomic status. The Reagan Democrats were excited by Reagan's antiblack rhetoric of law and order, a rhetoric that was in response against the activities of the Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground, Black Panthers, and Black Guerilla Family. Marxists think a person is in a state of false consciousness if her political or social interests go another way than her material or financial interests. If you adopt this view, then you probably think that the Reagan Democrats just need to be educated correctly about what they have in common with the black poor and working class. You have to think that their hatred of black people is somehow "false" simply because it runs counter to their financial interests. But this would be to ignore their interest in maintaining white supremacy and antiblack racism. One of the things white men would lose would be access to black bodies for sexual pleasure and amusement. These examples are not just isolated cases of false consciousness, ignorance, media manipulation, or some mystical thing called "prejudice." They are all of those things, but they are also something much, much greater that any student of struggle needs to be aware of. These examples reveal the contours of an economy of desires that is not primarily concerned with money. It's not that the political economy isn't also antiblack. In fact, both economies are antiblack.

### Case

#### No turn to the generative aspect of the alt because it’s a question of starting points, which is the root cause debate Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.